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The goal of this research is to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks on nuclear
power plants. Cyber-physical systems such as nuclear power plants consist of interconnected
physical processes and computational resources. Because the cyber and physical worlds are
integrated, vulnerabilities in both the cyber and physical domains can result in physical
damage to the system. Nuclear power plants can be targeted by a variety of adversaries
— each with a unique motivation and set of resources. To secure nuclear power plants and
other cyber-physical systems, we require an approach to security that also accounts for the
interactions of human decision-makers.
This research uses a game-theoretic approach to nuclear cybersecurity. The cybersecurity
of the plant can be viewed as a non-cooperative game between a defender and an attacker.
The field of game theory provides a mathematical framework to analyze the interactions
of the defender and attacker as both players seek to accomplish their objectives. In this
research, a stochastic Bayesian game is used to optimize cybersecurity decision-making. A
stochastic Bayesian game is a combination of a stochastic game and a Bayesian game. The
stochastic elements of the game enable the consideration of uncertainty in the interactions
of the attacker and defender. The Bayesian elements of the game enable the consideration of
the uncertainty regarding the attacker’s characteristics. This combination is useful for the
analysis of nuclear power plant cybersecurity because it enables plant defenders to optimize
their security decisions in the presence of uncertainty.
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1.0 Introduction
The goal of this research is to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks on nuclear power
plants (NPPs). Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) such as NPPs consist of interconnected
physical processes and computational resources [51]. Because the cyber and physical worlds
are integrated, vulnerabilities in both the cyber and physical domains can result in physical
damage to the system [79]. A cyber attack that has an adverse effect on physical processes
is called a cyber-physical attack. NPPs are subject to federal cyber and physical security
regulations, but are still susceptible to attack by various adversaries in an ever-evolving
threat landscape. If this research is successful, we should be able to do the following: predict
how adversaries might target an NPP, quantify NPP security, and optimally allocate security
resources to defend the NPP.
There are many examples of NPPs being targeted by both internal and external threats.
In 2003, the safety display of the Davis-Besse NPP was disabled by the Microsoft SQL Server
worm [92]. This attack was not directed at the Davis-Besse plant, but was accidentally
introduced to the system by a contractor’s infected computer. In 2009, a former employee at
Energy Future Holdings hacked the Comanche Peak NPP’s energy forecast system through a
VPN that was not deactivated after his employment was terminated [53]. Perhaps the most
famous incident of a successful attack on a nuclear system is Stuxnet [25]. Stuxnet damaged
Iranian centrifuges by masking system measurements while causing the centrifuges to operate
erratically [48]. While this attack did not target a commercial NPP, it demonstrates the
potentially severe consequences of a cyber-physical attack.
The Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that NPPs could be vulnerable to
cyber-physical attacks, and has identified two cyber-physical security goals in the Nuclear
Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector-Specific Plan: (1) to reduce physical and cyber risks
to nuclear sector assets and (2) to enable a risk-informed approach to security and resiliency
enhancements [85]. This research addresses both of these goals by developing an approach
to analyze the cyber-physical security of an NPP.
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In addition, we must also consider the behavior of the humans who interact with the
NPP. NPPs can be targeted by a variety of adversaries such as state agents, hacktivists, and
disgruntled employees — each with a unique motivation and set of resources [60]. To secure
NPPs and other CPSs, we require an approach to cyber-physical security that accounts for
the interactions of human decision-makers. By considering the cyber-physical properties of
an NPP and the behavior of the human decision-makers who interact with it, we can develop
effective security strategies to protect the plant.
1.1 Research Objectives
We will reduce the likelihood of successful attacks on NPP by achieving the following
research objectives:
1. Predict how an adversary might target a nuclear power plant
First, we must be able to assess the impact of a given attack on the NPP. This requires
an understanding of both the cyber and physical characteristics of the plant. An example
of a cyber characteristic is the NPP’s network structure, and an example of a physical
characteristic is the dynamics of plant systems. Using this information, we can assess
the potential impact of a given cyber-physical attack and determine if the attack could
be attractive to an adversary.
Second, we must be able to assess whether an adversary with knowledge of an attack’s
potential impact would choose to conduct the attack. A range of factors influence whether
an adversary will attack a system, and how the adversary will conduct the attack. These
factors include the cost of the attack, the benefit gained by the adversary if the attack
is successful, and the penalty incurred by the adversary if the attack is unsuccessful.
The adversary’s decisions are also dependent on the costs, benefits, and penalties of
those defending the plant. For example, an adversary may be more likely to attack a
component if it is expensive for the defender to protect it. This interaction of adversary
and defender cost parameters must be studied to predict how an adversary might target
an NPP.
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2. Quantify nuclear power plant security
We will provide metrics that quantify the security level of the NPP. These metrics will
describe the expected state of the NPP if a given security strategy is selected. For
example, the operational capacity of the NPP can be described using metrics such as the
mean time-to-failure and mean availability. The economics of the NPP can be described
by considering the security costs and the financial consequences of a successful attack,
among other factors. Using these metrics, we can analyze the efficacy of defense strategies
with respect to the spectrum of attack strategies.
3. Optimally allocate security resources to defend a nuclear power plant
With a quantitative understanding of the attacker’s and defender’s behavior, we can
determine how to most effectively protect the NPP. Security strategies may include
plant equipment upgrades such as redundant sensors or cybersecurity upgrades such
as improved firmware scanning. Cyber and physical security must both be considered to
defend a nuclear power plant from cyber-physical attacks.
By achieving these objectives, we have developed a technique to optimally defend an
NPP given our knowledge of the potential attackers. This approach will enable security
engineers to enhance the security of NPP with respect to the modern cyber-physical threat
landscape. The methods developed in this research will be readily applicable to other critical
infrastructure and cyber-physical systems.
1.2 Research Approach
The goal of this research is to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks on nuclear
power plants. Cyber-physical systems such as nuclear power plants consist of interconnected
physical processes and computational resources. Because the cyber and physical worlds are
integrated, vulnerabilities in both the cyber and physical domains can result in physical
damage to the system. Nuclear power plants can be targeted by a variety of adversaries
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— each with a unique motivation and set of resources. To secure nuclear power plants and
other cyber-physical systems, we require an approach to security that also accounts for the
interactions of human decision-makers.
This dissertation presents a game-theoretic approach to nuclear cybersecurity. The
cybersecurity of the plant can be viewed as a non-cooperative game between a defender and
an attacker. The field of game theory provides a mathematical framework to analyze the
interactions of the defender and attacker as both players seek to accomplish their objectives.
The purpose of game theory is to identify the optimal strategy for each player.
The cyber-physical security of an NPP system is studied using a stochastic Bayesian game
(SBG). An SBG is a combination of a stochastic game and a Bayesian game. Stochastic
game theory enables us to analyze interactions between players where the outcome of
the interactions is uncertain. Bayesian game theory enables us to consider uncertainties
regarding the characteristics of the players. This combination of stochastic and Bayesian
games is useful for the analysis of NPP cybersecurity because it enables plant defenders to
optimize their security decisions in the presence of uncertainty.
The SBG is used to identify an optimal cybersecurity strategy by applying two
techniques: Bayesian learning and Harsanyi-Bellman ad hoc coordination (HBA). Using
Bayesian learning, the defender can use his observations of the attacker’s actions and the
game history to update his beliefs about the attacker’s characteristics as the game is played.
HBA can then be used by the defender to select a cybersecurity strategy in real-time. HBA
combines game-theoretic equilibrium concepts with optimal control to identify the optimal
strategy.
1.3 Contributions
Although game theory has been applied to address a variety of security challenges, little
research has been done to apply game theory to the cybersecurity of nuclear power plants.
Some security problems have been cast as stochastic games and as Bayesian games, but
combined stochastic Bayesian games have not yet been used to address security challenges.
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Stochastic Bayesian games have been used in the fields of artificial intelligence and multi-
agent systems, but the application of these games for the cybersecurity of nuclear power
plants is new.
This research provides new insight regarding the practical implementation of game theory
for nuclear cybersecurity. Mathematicians have developed a significant body of literature
surrounding game theory, but literature describing its implementation is scarce. This work
demonstrates several techniques to bridge the gap between theory and practice. These
techniques rely on tools familiar to cybersecurity experts, but their application to a game-
theoretic approach is new.
The main contributions of this work to the field of NPP cybersecurity are:
1. an approach to characterize threats to NPPs and model them as attacker types in a
Bayesian game
2. an approach to construct the state space of a stochastic security game
3. an approach to define the transition function of a stochastic security game
4. a novel application of stochastic Bayesian games to cybersecurity challenges
5. methods to approximate Harsanyi-Bellman ad hoc coordination solution methods for
stochastic Bayesian games with large action spaces
1.4 Broader Impact
While this research is focused specifically on applications for commercial nuclear power
plants, the approach can be generalized to defend other critical infrastructures. For example,
the chemical sector consists of several hundred thousand chemical plants that convert raw
materials to a variety of chemical products. Similar to commercial nuclear power plants,
many chemical plants are CPSs that must operate within strict limitations to safely produce
the desired chemical product. A cyber-physical attack on a chemical plant could result in
faulty products, damaged machinery, environmental hazards, and unsafe conditions for plant
employees and the surrounding public. Other critical infrastructure sectors such as critical
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manufacturing, dams, communications, energy, and transportation are susceptible to similar
operating restrictions and may suffer similar consequences if attacked by a threat agent [81].
This research is applicable to protect these critical infrastructures from cyber-physical
attacks from the spectrum of threat agents. Using the proposed stochastic Bayesian game
framework, defenders can identify optimal strategies to protect the system, even when
faced with uncertainty about the threat agents. This will enable critical infrastructure
sectors to implement defenses that provide adequate protection for the system, and to avoid
overspending on superfluous security measures.
This research is also applicable to military systems. A 2013 task force report issued by
the Defense Science Board emphasizes the severity of the cyber-threat to critical military and
intelligence systems [20]. If the United States enters a conflict with a peer adversary, they
could be susceptible to a variety of attacks disrupting communication systems, the supply
chain, and offensive capabilities. Many of the postulated attacks could be cyber-physical
with severe consequences.
By applying this research, military security analysts could effectively allocate finite
security resources to ensure the greatest likelihood of mission success. The stochastic
Bayesian game approach enables analysts to leverage intelligence gathered about the
adversary, and to account for uncertainty in that intelligence. Resources can then be
allocated to adequately defend mission-critical assets without overspending or interfering
with the ability to complete the mission.
1.5 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the state of the art and
limits of current practice. Chapter 3 provides an overview of stochastic Bayesian games
— the foundation of the research approach. Chapter 3 also describes how the defender
can apply Bayesian techniques to learn about the attacker as the game is played and how
the defender can select an optimal security strategy in real-time using Harsanyi-Bellman
ad hoc coordination. Chapter 4 describes the construction of the development of our
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case study, Chapter 5 provides examples of the game played against each attacker, and
Chapter 6 provides the results and discussion. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation
and summarizes our research contributions.
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2.0 State of the Art and Limits of Current Practice
This chapter presents the state of the art and limits of current practice of cybersecurity
analysis techniques for industrial control systems (ICSs). First, we broadly discuss various
approaches to cybersecurity for ICSs, and their limitations. Second, we discuss game-
theoretic approaches to cybersecurity, and their limitations. We conclude with a summary
of the key limitations that are addressed by this research.
2.1 ICS Cybersecurity Methods
The importance of securing CPS in critical infrastructure was identified by various
researchers in the early 2000’s [16, 90, 11], and was addressed by the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) in 2002 [84]. As part of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Board
established in 2001, the DOE provided a list of recommendations for organizations to increase
the security of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks and establish an
effective cyber security program. Unfortunately, it was not until the Stuxnet attack of 2010
that the security of CPS became more widely discussed [89, 76]. More recently, a ransomware
attack forced the Colonial Pipeline to shut down for five days, thereby causing fuel shortages
on the east coast of the United States [88]. This section presents several methods used to
secure CPS.
2.1.1 Expert-Elicited Models
Expert-elicited models are computational models derived from expert characterization
of the system [36]. Experts characterize the system by considering factors such as the
importance of ICS components and functions, and how these resources could be targeted by
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an attacker. These characterizations are quantified and used as inputs to a computational
model. The computational model is then analyzed to identify effective security strategies to
ensure mission success.
The expert-elicited approach consists of three general steps [36]. In the first step, the
system is described by its function and components, and the connections between components
identified. The vulnerabilities of components and the consequences of their compromise
are also identified. In the second step, experts are consulted to estimate numerical
parameters describing the system and its components, such as component importance and
the consequence of the component being compromised. In the third step, the expert-elicited
parameters are used by the mathematical model to characterize risk to the system. The
complexity of the model can vary significantly.
The NIST Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an example of an expert-
elicited model [28]. The CVSS is used to measure the severity of vulnerabilities in cyber-
systems. To use the CVSS, experts first characterize the system using several categorical
variables. These variables include descriptions of the exploitability of a vulnerability and
the vulnerability’s impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Several equations are
then used to calculate the vulnerability’s score on a scale from zero to ten. A vulnerability
with a greater score are considered to be more severe than one with a lower score. The CVSS
exploitability parameters are discussed in greater detail in Section 4.5.1.
One limitation of expert-elicited models is the introduction of unintentional bias by the
experts [36]. Experts often tend to describe the system in terms of its normal operation and
intended uses. Resources are often prioritized by their importance during normal operations
and resources that are rarely used are often neglected. Some of these limitations can be
mitigated to some degree by using a large group of experts, or by conducting red-team
exercises. Cybersecurity approaches for ICSs should be able to address security scenarios
outside of normal operations.
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2.1.2 Attack Graphs
Attack graphs are a modelling tool used to show the sequence of actions taken by an
attacker to achieve a goal [36]. Attack graphs are generally used to assess the intrusion
methods and path of attacker given the initial conditions of the system. Attack graphs can
be used to gain insight about system features such as the network topology and access control
mechanisms. The nodes in an attack graph represent system resources and privileges, and
the edges represent the reachability to one resource from another [3].
An example of an attack graph for a network is shown in Figure 1. The attacker begins at
the top, and is trying to reach the target at the bottom. The green triangle node represents
the initial conditions of the attacker and the red octagon represents the attack target. Initial
conditions of the network are represented by the blue rectangles. Based on the attacker’s
initial capabilities and the conditions of the network, the attacker can conduct exploit 1A or
exploit 2 to attempt to reach the target. Exploit 2 leads directly to the target, but exploit
1A results in an intermediate condition that, when combined with another initial condition
of the network, enables the attacker to launch exploit 1B to reach the target.
Many graph-based methods are deterministic and do not account for the difficulty of
attack actions. These attack graphs provide insight regarding which states are theoretically
reachable, but do not provide insight regarding the path of least resistance for the attacker.
Consider the example in Figure 1. Although the right path requires fewer steps than left
path, if exploit 2 is sufficiently difficult, the attacker might instead choose exploit 1A and
1B. Some graphs do account for path difficulty to provide probabilistic security assessments,
such as those in [104, 66].
One limitation of attack graphs is the inability to model dynamic defense strategies. This
means that the attacker proceeds through the attack graph given an initial defense strategy
that does not change. This is a reasonable assumption for many passive cybersecurity actions
such as access control, but does not accurately model active cybersecurity actions such as
intrusion detection systems.
Another limitation of attack graphs is the inability to model cyclical behaviors. Attack














Figure 1: An example of an attack graph.
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that following the directions along the edges will not result in a closed loop. This property
is useful for analyzing the graph, and is appropriate for many cybersecurity applications.
The general justification for this property is that the attacker is not likely to yield access
or privileges to ICS devices once he has obtained them. This assumption is often valid, but
does not capture the situation where the defender partially expunges the attacker from the
system.
2.1.3 Petri Nets
Petri nets are another graphical mathematical tool used to evaluate cybersecurity. They
were originally developed to model chemical reactions, but have since been applied to
many other systems and processes. Other applications include biological systems [105],
cryptography [18], communication protocols [37], and automatic control [31].
Petri nets contain two types of elements: places and transitions [71]. Places are
represented by ellipses and model passive components. Transitions are represented by
bars or rectangles and model active components. Transitions and places are connected by
directional arrows called arcs. Arcs do not connect places to other places or transitions to
other transitions.
Places can contain an integer number of tokens, represented by dots inside the place. A
particular configuration of tokens over the Petri net is called a marking. A transition can
only occur, or be fired, if each of the input places has at least one token. When a transition
is fired, one token is withdrawn from each of the input places and one token is added to each
of the output places. The progression of the Petri net’s markings represents the dynamics
of the modelled system [19].
An example of a Petri net is shown in Figure 2 [19]. Places are designated by P and
transitions are designated by T . The places P2, P4, and P6 have tokens. The transitions T2
and T5 are enabled. The transition T6 is not enabled because P7 does not have a token.
There are several methods to analyze Petri nets [103]. One example is reachability
analysis. Reachability analysis provides the markings that can be reached from an initial
















Figure 2: An example of a Petri net [19].
node in the tree is a particular marking, and each arc in the tree is a transition firing.
A similar idea to reachability is coverability. Coverability problems examine whether a
particular marking is part of a reachable marking.
In the context of cybersecurity, Petri nets can be used to model an attacker’s exploitation
of system vulnerabilities. Tokens can be used to represent the access or privileges gained by
the attacker through an exploit. Transitions can be fired once the attacker has accumulated
the necessary privileges and tokens to allow the attack to continue. Given the initial marking
of the Petri net, reachability analysis can show which privileges can be obtained by the
attacker throughout the course of the attack.
One limitation of Petri nets is that solving complex nets can be computationally
expensive [103]. For complex Petri nets, constructing a reachability tree is not feasible
and coverability graphs may exhibit poor behavior. Simulation-based approaches are often
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used to study reachability for these nets. Large-scale simulation efforts generally involve
the initialization of the Petri net with a given marking, and randomly selecting enabled
transitions to fire. While this approach is straightforward, it is time-consuming.
2.2 Game-Theoretic Approaches to Cybersecurity
In order to properly allocate security resources in a CPS, one must consider the
motivations and resources of all decision-makers who interact with the system. By
considering these factors, we can avoid allocating excessive security resources towards low-
impact components or allocating insufficient resources towards high-impact components.
This prioritization is simple when only one decision-maker interacts with the system, but
becomes complex when multiple decision-makers with different priorities must be considered.
The field of game theory enables us to analyze the interactions of multiple rational
decision-makers. The security of a CPS can be viewed as a non-cooperative game between
a defender and an attacker. The attacker’s objectives vary, and may include environmental
damage, economic damage, physical damage, or loss of life. The defender’s objectives include
maximizing profits, maintaining system operations, and avoiding environment, health, or
safety incidents. Game theory was first applied to cyber-physical security challenges in the
early 2000’s to study network intrusion detection and network security [54, 9, 7]. Since then,
many researchers have applied game theory to analyze the security of CPSs. The remainder
of this chapter discusses different types of games and their application to the security of
CPSs.
2.2.1 Strategic Form Games
The most simple type of game is the strategic form game. Strategic form games are used
to describe scenarios where the players make decisions simultaneously. These games can
provide basic insight towards the interaction between decision-makers and are often used as
a starting point before developing more complex games.
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Several strategic form games with national security applications are discussed in [15].
Applications include arms races, optimal threats, crisis stability, and deterrence. For
example, consider the deterrence game. In this game, there are two parties capable of
inflicting harm upon the other. Each party believes that the other party will retaliate to
an attack with a particular probability. By studying this game, the conditions are identified
where neither party takes offensive action and the conflict is avoided. Although these games
were developed to describe interactions between nations with nuclear weapons capabilities,
there are parallels with the development of offensive cyber-capabilities.
A strategic form game was also used to identify effective security strategies for an ICS in
[59, 58]. In this game, the attacker chooses a set of sensors to attack and the defender chooses
a set of sensors to defend. If particular sets of sensors are successfully hacked, the attacker
can compromise the defender’s observability of the system and cause damage unbeknownst
to the defender. An effective security strategy was identified by applying a game-theoretic
framework to examine the cost and benefit of each attack and defense. This example is
discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.
Several strategic form games with network security applications are discussed in [8].
Applications include intrusion detection, malicious behavior on social networks, wireless
networks, and vehicular networks. In the vehicular networks example, vehicles can
communicate with one another and with roadside units. The roadside units can tunnel
data to improve communication between vehicles. The attacker can choose regions of
the road to target with communication jamming attacks. A game-theoretic approach is
used to determine the optimal distribution of the roadside units to maintain an effective
communication network.
2.2.2 Stochastic Games
The field of stochastic game theory is used to study the interactions of decision-makers
when the outcome of the decisions are uncertain [27]. As decisions are made by each
player, the game traverses a set of states that describe the progress of the game. At each
decision point, the players choose an action. The resulting actions provide the probability of
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transitioning to each state in the stochastic state space. Each player receives an immediate
reward resulting from the actions and state transition. Each player seeks to maximize his
cumulative reward earned throughout the game. Using optimization techniques, we can
determine the optimal action for each player at each state and determine each player’s
expected cumulative reward.
Stochastic games are applied to address network security applications in [8]. Applications
include intrusion detection, the security of interconnected systems, and malware filter
placement. While these systems are not inherently cyber-physical, the stochastic game-
theoretic approach can be extended to ICSs and CPSs.
A stochastic game was used to study the cybersecurity of a boiling water power plant [65].
The states were defined by the operational status of the plant and observability of the cyber-
attack. The game was conducted in continuous time with an accompanying continuous-time
model of the plant. The effects of various parameters such as the penalty to the attacker if
caught, attack detection probability, and attack speed were examined to identify favorable
cybersecurity scenarios for the plant.
Stochastic games have also been studied for the response to cyber-incidents in nuclear
power plants. A case study was given for a digital feedwater system in [108]. The game
was characterized as a discrete-time competitive Markov decision process and the states
were defined by the operational status of the ICS devices and plant components. Fault
tree and event tree analysis were used to describe the transitions between states. A dynamic
programming approach was used to find a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium provided
the optimal defense action for each state in the game.
2.2.3 Bayesian Games
Bayesian games are used to study interactions where at least one player has uncertainty
about the characteristics of the other players. Within the context of a security game, the
defender may be unsure about the parameters describing the attacker. The defender could
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then construct several attacker “types”, each of which describes the attacker with a different
set of parameters. The defender then assigns a probability to each type, and the game can
be solved with traditional game theory methods [33, 34, 35].
Bayesian games have been applied to various physical security challenges. For example,
consider the approach developed in [78] for airport security patrols. The security challenge is
cast as a Bayesian Stackelberg game — a game where one player must commit to an action
before the other player. For the airport security problem, the defender must first commit to
a patrol schedule before the attacker selects a target. An efficient algorithm was designed to
identify the best defense strategy and randomize patrols within that strategy.
Bayesian games are applied to network security application in [8]. Examples include
intrusion detection and the security of wireless networks. While these systems are not
inherently cyber-physical, the Bayesian game-theoretic approach can be extended to ICSs
and CPSs.
Bayesian games are applied to a cyber-physical manufacturing setting in [107]. A
medium-sized manufacturing facility with a continuous production line is studied. The
facility could be targeted by an insider or a cybercriminal with varying risk attitudes. Using
this approach, an effective security strategy can be identified based on the defender’s beliefs
about the attacker’s characteristics.
2.2.4 Limits of Current Practice
Most stochastic games are structured as two-player games. While this approach provides
some insight into security problems, it is not representative of the security challenges faced
by NPP. NPP face a variety of adversaries with different capabilities and motivations. For
example, an NPP must be resilient to threats such as state actors, terrorists, disgruntled
employees, and cyber criminals. These threats have different technical abilities, resources,
and goals. To accurately use game theory to inform security decisions, these threats and
their objectives must be addressed.
It can be difficult to estimate the values of parameters used to describe the adversaries
in a game. For example, it is difficult to estimate the reward that the attacker will gain if
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an attack is successful. These rewards are functions of the subjective value that the attacker
places on non-monetary outcomes such as the loss of life and press coverage. One method
of addressing these uncertainties is by applying a Bayesian game structure. Little research
exists that combines the benefits of a Bayesian game with the framework of a stochastic
game [4].
Another challenge in analyzing stochastic games is managing the size of the stochastic
state space. For example, consider a system consisting of n components, each of which has
two possible states (e.g. functional and nonfunctional). The resulting stochastic state space
will have a dimension of 2n states to account for each possible combination of component
states. A large state space presents computational challenges and challenges in interpreting
the results of the game. Methods are desired to manage the size of the stochastic state space
so that the analysis of the game can be used to inform practical security decisions.
Many game-theoretic security approaches rely on the Nash equilibrium as the game’s
solution concept. A Nash equilibrium occurs when each player has selected a strategy that
is a best response to the strategies of the other players. The Nash equilibrium is an attractive
solution concept because each player can predict the equilibrium, and predict that each other
player will predict it, and so on. No player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the
equilibrium — doing so would only decrease that player’s payoff.
While the Nash equilibrium solution method is widely implemented, it is not valid if it
cannot be predicted by all players in the game. For complex stochastic games, it is possible
that not all players will model the game in the same manner and arrive at the same Nash
equilibrium. This becomes increasingly challenging if the game has multiple Nash equilibria.
Another challenge with the Nash equilibrium solution is that it provides a static defense
strategy. If both players select the strategies corresponding to the same Nash equilibrium
solution, then a static defense strategy is not only appropriate, it is optimal. But, if the
players do not arrive at the same Nash equilibrium solution, it would be advantageous to
allow the defense strategy to change over time to arrive at a best response to the adversary’s
strategy.
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2.3 Summary of Limits of Current Practice
In summary, this research will address the following key limits of current practice:
1. Lack of research on stochastic Bayesian games for security applications
2. Challenge of determining game-theoretic parameters
3. Lack of formal methods to manage the size of the stochastic state-space
4. Challenge of validating the Nash equilibrium as a solution method
5. Challenge of designing dynamic defense strategies
By addressing these limitations, we will be able to apply stochastic and Bayesian game
theory to design holistic cyber-physical defense strategies for NPP that address a variety of
adversaries.
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3.0 Stochastic Bayesian Games
This chapter provides a theoretical foundation for this work. Stochastic and Bayesian
games are used to address different types of uncertainty in a game. In a stochastic game, the
outcomes of the players’ actions are uncertain. In a Bayesian game, the players are uncertain
about the parameters that govern the decision-making of the other players. This chapter
will discuss stochastic and Bayesian games in greater detail, and introduce the combination
of these two types of games: a stochastic Bayesian game.
3.1 Preliminaries
This section provides an overview of preliminary game theory concepts. These concepts
provide the necessary framework to discuss more sophisticated games. We introduce the
game theory vernacular within the context of strategic form games. Strategic form games
are used to model situations where players select their strategies simultaneously. We discuss
the components of a game, and introduce the Nash equilibrium – the fundamental solution
method used in game theory.
A strategic form game is defined by three components:
1. Players: the agents who are participating in the game
2. Strategies: the set of choices available to each player
3. Utilities: the numerical payoffs for each player. The utilities are functions of the strategies
chosen by the players.
Strategic form games are often represented using matrices. Consider the prisoners’
dilemma game shown in Table 1. Utilities for each player are given for each strategy
intersection, with Row’s utility listed first. In this game, two prisoners are each given an
opportunity to reduce their sentences. Each prisoner is spoken to individually, and told that
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Table 1: Prisoners’ dilemma in the strategic form.
Column
Cooperate (C) Not cooperate (NC)
R
ow
Cooperate (C) -2, -2 10, -5
Not cooperate (NC) -5, 10 0, 0
their sentence will be reduced if they cooperate and implicate the other prisoner. If neither
prisoner cooperates, their sentences remain unchanged, and if both prisoners cooperate, both
prisoners receive worse sentences.
A best response is a player’s optimal strategy, given the strategies selected by the other
players. For player i with utility function ui, strategy s
∗
i is a best response to the strategies
s−i chosen by the other players (denoted by −i subscript) if
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) ∀si (3.1)
In the prisoners’ dilemma game, the best response to cooperation is cooperation. The
best response to not cooperating is also cooperation. Because cooperating is always more
profitable than not cooperating, it is said that not cooperating is strictly dominated by
cooperating. A rational player would never select a strategy that is strictly dominated
because there is always a more profitable strategy than the dominated strategy. Therefore,
in this prisoner’s dilemma game, it is always best for each prisoner to cooperate, regardless
of the strategy chosen by the other prisoner.
Suppose both prisoners choose to cooperate. Here each prisoner is playing a best response
to the strategy of the other prisoner. This is called a Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile
(s∗i , s
∗





−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i) ∀si, i (3.2)
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At a Nash equilibrium, no individual player has an incentive to unilaterally change his
strategy. In this game, deviation from the Nash equilibrium of (C,C) to (NC,C) or (C,NC)
would reduce the utility of the deviating player from -2 to -5.
Note that although (C,C) is a Nash equilibrium, it is not the most profitable outcome
for the players. The strategy profile (NC,NC) yields a greater utility for both players.
Why, then, is (C,C) the game’s solution rather than (NC,NC)? Noncooperation is not the
solution because it is not a stable strategy profile. Although (NC,NC) results in greater
payoffs than (C,C), there is incentive for players to unilaterally deviate from the (NC,NC)
profile. For example, suppose Row believes Column will not cooperate. Row will then either
receive a utility of ten for cooperating, or a utility of zero for not cooperating. Cooperating
is Row’s best response. Column can reason similarly about Row’s actions. Therefore, both
players choose to cooperate.
Nash proved that at least one Nash equilibrium exists for every finite strategic form game
[63]. There is one nuance to this statement: the Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to be an
equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium may include mixed strategies, i.e. probability
distributions over the pure strategies. Given a set of pure strategies, Si = {s1, s2, . . . , sN},
a mixed strategy is defined as a probability vector σ = (p1, p2, . . . , pN) where 0 ≤ pk ≤ 1 for
k = 1, . . . , N , and
∑N
k=1 p
k = 1. A pure strategy can be expressed as a mixed strategy where
one pure strategy is assigned a probability of one and all other pure strategies are assigned
a probability of zero. Pure strategies that are assigned positive probability are said to be in
the support of the mixed strategy. We will discuss mixed strategy Nash equilibria with an
example.
Consider the game of matching pennies shown in Table 2. In matching pennies, each
player has a penny, and each secretly places it in either the heads or tails position. Row
receives positive utility if the pennies match, and Column receives positive utility if the
pennies do not match.
The best responses for each player are identified by underlined utilities in Table 2. In
this game, there is no pure strategy profile where both players are playing a best response,
therefore there is not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. There is a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium where each player assigns a probability of 0.5 to heads and a probability of
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Table 2: Match pennies in the strategic form.
Column
Heads (H) Tails (T )
R
ow
Heads (H) 1, -1 -1, 1
Tails (T ) -1, 1 1, -1
0.5 to tails. The utility earned by each player at a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is an
expected value taken over the mixed strategies. For a general two-player game played by i







In the matching pennies game, the expected utility for both players at the Nash equilibrium
is zero.
An example of a strategic form game for cybersecurity applications is given in Appendix
A. Now that we have defined basic game theory concepts, we can begin our discussion of
Bayesian games, stochastic games, and stochastic Bayesian games.
3.2 Bayesian Games
A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which some players do not
necessarily know the payoffs of other players. Each uncertain player constructs a set of
“types” that describe each possible set of parameters governing the other players. Within the
context of NPP security, Bayesian games can be used to address the defender’s uncertainty
about the attacker’s parameters.
Consider the Bayesian game shown in table 3. In this game, an NPP defender is
attempting to protect the plant from a threat, but is unsure whether the attacker is a
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Table 3: A Bayesian security game. For each strategy intersection, the defender’s payoff and
attacker’s payoff are provided.
Type 1: Disgruntled Employee
Probability = 0.8
Attack 1 Attack 2
Defense 1 0, 2 -10, 1
Defense 2 -3, 10 0, -2
Type 2: Terrorist
Probability = 0.2
Attack 1 Attack 2
Defense 1 0, -1 -10, 10
Defense 2 -3, 3 0, 4
disgruntled employee or a terrorist. A separate game matrix is constructed for each attacker
type. Within each matrix, the rows correspond to the defender’s strategies, the columns
correspond to the attacker’s strategies, and the utilities of both players are specified for
every strategy intersection.
In this game, it can be seen that if the attacker is Type 1, then Attack 1 strictly dominates
Attack 2. If the defender knew he were facing a Type 1 attacker, he would then conclude
that if the attacker is going to select Attack 1, he should select Defense 1 to maximize his
payoff. Similarly, if the attacker is Type 2, then Attack 2 strictly dominates Attack 1. If the
defender knew he were facing a Type 2 attacker, he would then conclude that if the attacker
is going to select Attack 2, he should select Defense 2 to maximize his payoff. Bayesian game
theory provides a method for the defender to choose his strategy given that he is uncertain
about the attacker’s true type.
A probability distribution is first assigned to the set of player types to describe the
player’s uncertain belief about each player type’s likelihood. With the assumption that the
types and type distributions are common knowledge, the Bayesian game can be transformed
from a game of incomplete information to a game of imperfect information, and solved using
standard Nash equilibrium techniques [29]. The equilibrium of the game in Table 3 occurs
when the defender plays Defense 1, a Type 1 attacker plays Attack 1, and a Type 2 attacker
plays Attack 2.
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The attacker may also be uncertain about the parameters that govern the defender. For
example, the attacker may be uncertain whether the defender is risk-averse or risk-embracing.
A Bayesian game can be constructed in which both players have uncertainty regarding their
opponent’s parameters. Again, with the assumption that the types and type distributions
are common knowledge, the Bayesian game can be transformed into a game of imperfect
information and solved using Nash equilibrium techniques.
3.2.1 Bayesian Games in the Extensive Form
The extensive form is a representation of a game where the actions chosen by the players
are represented as a decision tree. The extensive form can include the assumption that the
players have a common prior belief regarding the distribution of types. The common prior
assumption is enacted by introducing a chance node, Nature, that stochastically assigns the
types to each player. Information sets are used to define the knowledge that is available to
each player, such as Nature’s type assignments and the actions selected by the other players
[22].
Consider a Bayesian simultaneous game played by i and j. Let the set Θi = {θ1i , θ2i }
contain the types of i and let the set Θj = {θ1j , θ2j} contain the types of j, where the
superscript notation indexes the types within their respective sets. Let the probability that i
is type θ1i and j is type θ
2
j be denoted p12 and let the probability of the other types be similarly
defined. Let the action sets available to the player be Ai = {a1i , a2i } and Aj = {a1j , a2j}. In
this game, the players choose their actions simultaneously and without communication. Let
the utility functions be ui(si, sj, θi, θj) and uj(si, sj, θi, θj), where si/j is the player’s strategy
for action selection. The extensive form of this Bayesian game is shown in Figure 3.
The extensive form of a game consists of nodes and branches. Nodes in the tree represent
a point where a decision is to be made, and branches represent each of the possible decisions.
Nodes that are owned by players are shaded and chance nodes are not shaded. At a player’s
node, that player must choose from the set of actions available to determine the progress
of the game. At a chance node, the progress of the game is dependent on a probability




















































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: The extensive form of a Bayesian simultaneous game.
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In the game in Figure 3, the only chance node is the Nature node that assigns the
players their types. Chance nodes can also be used to model scenarios where the outcome
of the players’ actions is uncertain. For example, consider a scenario where an attacker
has caused a device in an NPP to fail. For the device failure to cause a larger system
failure, redundant plant systems and safety systems must also fail. The outcome of the
attack is therefore dependent not only on the actions selected by the players, but also on the
occurrence of external events. These external events can be represented by chance nodes,
and their probabilities can be determined using risk analysis tools such as event tree analysis
[91] or Bayesian networks [26].
Information sets are used to model the players’ knowledge of their types and the actions
chosen by the other players. In the game in Figure 3, i’s information sets are shown by the
red rounded rectangles, and j’s information sets are shown by the blue rounded rectangles.
All of the nodes contained in a given information set are indistinguishable to that player.
Consider the information set for i of type θ1i . This information set is preceded by both types
of j because i does not know whether Nature has assigned j type θ1j or θ
2
j . It is also preceded
by the full action set of j for both types because while i is choosing an action, i does not
know the action chosen by j. The other information sets are similarly constructed.
3.2.2 Bayesian Nash Equilibria
The solution method of Bayesian games is called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where each type of each player has selected a
best response to the strategies of the other players. Every finite Bayesian game has at least
one Bayesian Nash equilibrium [33, 34, 35].
Before discussing the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we must define notation. The
components of a Bayesian game are the players, their actions, their strategies, their types,
their utility functions, and the probability distribution over the types.
Players Let I denote the set of players. Let i ∈ I denote an individual player i. Let I be
the total number of players. For notational convenience, let the subscript notation “−i”
denote all players except player i.
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Types Let Θi denote the set of types belonging to player i. Let θi ∈ Θi be a type of i.
Actions Let Ai,θ denote the set of actions available to player i of type θ. Let ai,θ ∈ Ai,θ be
an action selected by player i of type θ.
Strategies Let si, denote a strategy chosen by player i. A player’s strategy specifies
the actions selected by every type of that player. Let a strategy profile be denoted
s = (s1, . . . , sI). A strategy profile defines the action chosen by every type of every
player.
Utility functions Let ui(s1, . . . , sI , θ1, . . . , θI) be the utility function of player i. Generally,
the utility is a function of the strategies selected by the players and their types.
Probability distribution Let p(θ1, . . . , θI) be the probability distribution over the types.
The expected utility of player i with type θi is
E [ui(si, s−i, θi, θ−i)] =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
p(θ−i | θi)ui(si, s−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) (3.4)
The best response of a player to the strategies of the other players is the strategy that
maximizes the player’s expected utility.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where all types of all players have
selected best responses to the other players’ strategies. By this definition, no type has
incentive to unilaterally deviate from its equilibrium strategy. A strategy profile s∗ =
(s∗1, . . . , s
∗
















for all i ∈ I, for all si ∈ Si, and for all θi that have a positive probability.
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3.2.3 Solution Methods
A Bayesian game can be transformed into a normal-form game using the Harsanyi
transformation. The Harsanyi transformation uses the common prior assumption to
transform the incomplete information game to an imperfect information game. An example
of the Harsanyi transformation is shown in Table 4. The row player has one type and the
column player has two types. In both the original and the transformed game, the row player
has two pure strategies. In the original game, the column player has two pure strategies,
but in the transformed game the column player has four strategies. A single pure strategy
in the transformed game includes a pure strategy for each of the column player’s types in
the original game (strategy Y Z indicates that Type 1 plays Y and Type 2 plays Z). In
general, if the column player has α pure strategies and β types, the column player in the
normal-form game has αβ pure strategies. The payoffs for the players are calculated as a
weighted sum of the payoffs from the Bayesian game, where the weighting factors come from
the type distribution. Once the game is in normal form, several solution methods can be
used [102].
The Nash equilibria of Bayesian games in the extensive form can be found using software
such as Gambit [61]. Gambit is open-source software used to analyze finite non-cooperative
games. Gambit has both a command line interface and a graphical user interface, and is
particularly useful for visualizing game theory problems. Analyzing large games in Gambit
is not feasible. Using Gambit, we can identify each player’s Nash equilibrium strategy and
expected utility for games of a reasonable size. Large Bayesian games require specialized
algorithms to be solved [67, 68, 78]. An example application is given in Appendix B.
3.3 Stochastic Games
A stochastic game is a dynamic system that evolves as the players take action. As
the game progresses through time, it traverses a finite set of states, S, that describe the
environment of the players’ interaction. Consider the simple stochastic game played by an
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NPP defender and an attacker in Figure 4. In this example, the stochastic state space
includes three states. In the normal operating state, the plant is operating as expected. In
the penetrated state, the attacker has breached the plant’s defenses. Finally, in the damaged
state the attacker has caused damage to the plant. In this game, the damaged state is an
absorbing state — the game concludes when this state is reached.
Stochastic games may be modelled in continuous or discrete time. This work considers
discrete-time games. At each discrete time step in the game, each player selects from a finite
set of actions. The defender’s action set could include physical defenses such as maintaining
guard stations, and cyber defenses such as maintaining antivirus software. Similarly, the
attacker’s action set could include both cyber and physical attacks.
The actions selected by each player affect the probability of the state transitioning to
each of the other states in the stochastic state space. Within the context of a security game,
these transition probabilities are dependent on a variety of factors, including the skill of the
players and the complexity of their actions. Consider the transitions available in the game’s
normal state. If an attacker attempts to exploit a well-known vulnerability but the defender
has opted to address that vulnerability, then the game is likely to transition to the normal
state rather than the penetrated state.
Let the set of actions available to player i/j at state s be denoted ai/j(s). When both
players select their actions, the resulting action profile ai,j = (ai(s), aj(s)) determines the
probability of transitioning from state s to every other state in the stochastic state space.
After an action profile has been selected, the transition to the next state is determined
stochastically by a transition vector given by a function
T (s, ai, aj) =
(
p(s1|s, ai, aj), p(s2|s, ai, aj), . . . , p(sN |s, ai, aj)
)
(3.6)
For this work, given N states,
∑N
s′ p(s
′|s, ai, aj) = 1 for all s. This is not required in general,
and the value 1 −
∑N
s′ p(s
′|s, ai, aj) gives the stopping probability in cases where the sum
does not equal one. The stopping probability is the probability that the game ends in current
state given the action profile.
After each decision point, each player receives an immediate utility that is a function
of the current state, the actions selected by all players, and the state to which the game
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transitions. Within the context of a security game, the immediate utility of the defender is
generally a function of the cost of the selected defense action and the stochastic outcome
of the defense and attack action profile. The immediate utility for the attacker is similarly
defined. A cumulative utility function is defined to assess the immediate utilities earned by
the players throughout the game. An example of a cumulative utility function is
ui(s
0, σi, σj) =
∞∑
t=0
βtiE[ri(st, ati,j, st+1)] (3.7)
The cumulative utility is dependent on i’s and j’s strategies, σi and σj, and the initial
state, s0. The discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) describes i’s preferences for utility earned earlier
in the game relative to utility earned later in the game [27, 75]. The superscript t on the
discount factor is an exponent, and the superscript on the state and action profile variables
is a time index. The function E[·] denotes the expectation over the states and strategies for
the immediate utility function, ri.
Strategies in stochastic games are rules that determine the actions selected by a player
at any point in the game. There are four types of strategies: Markov strategies, semi-
Markov strategies, stationary strategies, and behavior strategies [27]. Markov strategies
provide a decision rule, ft for every time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where ft is determined by t and s
t.
Semi-Markov strategies are Markov strategies that are also dependent on the initial state
s0. Stationary strategies provide a decision rule that is only a function of the current state
(i.e. a Markov strategy without time dependence). Finally, behavior strategies are the most
general type of strategy. They provide a decision rule ft that is a function of t and the
history, H t = (s0, a0i,j, s
1, a1i,j, . . . , a
t−1
i,j , s
t), where superscripts are time indices. Behavior
strategies are used in this work.
3.3.1 Nash Equilibrium
Here we present the ε-Nash equilibrium of a two-player stochastic game with semi-Markov
strategies [108]. The existence of Nash equilibria in more complicated stochastic games and
the solution methods to find them are both areas of ongoing research [69, 62].
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First we define the value, vi(s
0), of a game with initial state s0 for player i as the quantity
ui(s











0, πi, π−i) (3.8)
The strategy profile (π1, π2) is an ε-Nash equilibrium if there are no unilateral deviations
that result in profit greater than or equal to ε. That is,
vi(s
0) ≥ ui(s0, πi, π∗−i)− ε, ∀πi, i ∈ {1, 2} (3.9)
If ε is zero, the ε-Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
An ε-Nash equilibrium can be found by solving the optimization problem given in
Equation 3.10, where the objective function is given by Equation 3.11 and Equation 3.12
defines a variable for notational convenience [108].
minimize
v1,v2,π1,π2




πi(s, ai)h−i(s, ai, a−i) ≤ v−i(s), ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ {1, 2}, ai ∈ Ai(s)
∑
ai∈Ai
πi(s, ai) = 1, ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ {1, 2}
πi(s, ai) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ {1, 2}, ai ∈ Ai(s)
(3.10)











π1(s, a1)π2(s, a2)hi(s, a1, a2)
]
(3.11)










The first constraint is obtained from the definition of the Nash equilibrium. The second
and third constraints are required to ensure that the mixed strategies are well-defined discrete
probability distributions. The nonlinear characteristics of this optimization problem present
challenges in finding the global optimum rather than a local optimum [108].
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3.4 Stochastic Bayesian Games
A stochastic Bayesian game (SBG) combines the features of stochastic games and
Bayesian games. The stochastic elements of the SBG enable the consideration of uncertainty
in the interactions of the attacker and defender. As in a stochastic game, a set of states define
the environment for the players’ interactions, and the state transitions occur stochastically as
a function of the players’ actions. The Bayesian elements of the SBG enable the consideration
of the uncertainty regarding the attacker’s characteristics. As in a Bayesian game, a set
of types are defined to describe possible behaviors of at least one of the players. This
combination is useful for the analysis of NPP security because it enables plant defenders
to optimize their security decisions in the presence of uncertainty. The remainder of this
section will discuss the application of an SBG to the security of a nuclear system.
3.4.1 Bayesian Learning of the Adversary’s Parameters
As the SBG is played, the defender can learn the characteristics of the attacker. As
the players interact through the SBG, the defender can use the attacker’s actions to
draw conclusions about the attacker’s game-theoretic parameters. The defender can draw
conclusions about not only the parameters of a single type of attacker, but about the
parameters governing the behavior of all potential attackers in the attacker’s type space
[6].
The defender first hypothesizes a set of possible attacker types, ΘA. For every θj ∈ ΘA,
the defender has an initial belief, P (θj|H0), which defines the probability that the attacker
has type θj given the initial information H
0 available to the defender. The defender also
has an initial estimate, p0j ∈ [pminj , pmaxj ], of the game-theoretic parameters governing each
type θj. At each time t > 0, a new estimate of the parameters, p
t
j, can be calculated based
on the updated history, H t−1, available to the defender. Here we use approximate Bayesian
updating to estimate ptj. Approximate Bayesian updating is summarized in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Approximate Bayesian updating [6]
1: Represent the belief P (ptj|H t−1, θj) as p̂: a polynomial of degree d
2: Represent the belief P (at−1j |H t−1, θj, p) as f̂ : a polynomial of degree d
3: Compute the polynomial product ĝ = f̂ · p̂
4: Collect samples D = (p(l), ĝ(p(l)))
5: Fit polynomial ĥ of degree d to D




7: Set new belief P (ptj|H t, θj) = ĥ/I
8: Extract new estimate pt from P (ptj|H t, θj)
A demonstration of approximate Bayesian updating is shown in Figure 5. Figure 5a
shows the prior belief over p given H t−1 and type θj, and the true value of p. This belief is
shown as a polynomial of degree d. Figure 5b shows the belief regarding the action given
H t−1 and θj as a function of p. This belief is sampled, and fit with a polynomial, f̂ . Figure 5c
shows the polynomial product of the prior belief and f̂ . This polynomial is sampled, and
represented as polynomial ĥ with degree d. This belief is normalized to obtain the posterior
belief. The posterior belief is shown in Figure 5d. The updated estimate of p is selected as
the value with the greatest belief density.
The use of polynomial approximations in approximate Bayesian updating does present
one challenge — the approximations may result in negative values of the belief within the
range of p values [6]. Two countermeasures must be taken to address this challenge. The first
countermeasure is to take the absolute integral of ĥ to obtain I. The second countermeasure
is to only sample points from ĝ that have positive values. This helps prevent propagation of
negative minima.
Using the new estimate ptj for type θj, the current belief regarding the type distribution
is updated by
P (θj|H t) ∝ P (at−1A |H
t−1, θj, p
t
j)P (θj|H t−1) (3.13)
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The probability functions used to calculate P (θj|H i) are dependent on the information
available to the defender, the attacker’s action, the type definitions, and the estimates of the
type’s parameters.
3.4.2 Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination
The typical solution method applied in game theory is the Nash equilibrium. At a Nash
equilibrium, each player’s strategy is the best response to the strategies of the other players.
Because of this property, no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the Nash
equilibrium. For this solution method to predict the play of a real game, the equilibrium
must be identified by all players and that fact must be common knowledge. For a complex
stochastic security game, this assumption may not be valid. Instead, we opt for a solution
method that informs security decisions in real-time as the game is played.
The solution method we select for the SBG is Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc coordination
(HBA) [5, 4]. In contrast to the predictive nature of the Nash equilibrium, HBA is a tool
used to select actions in real-time as the game evolves. HBA combines the concepts of
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium [34] and Bellman optimal control [13] to calculate optimal
actions based on the action history observed by the players. Given a postulated set of types
describing the opponent, HBA first uses the action history to calculate a discrete probability
distribution over the type set. Using this updated type distribution, HBA then calculates
the optimal strategy to maximize that player’s expected cumulative reward.
Mathematically, HBA is defined as atD ∼ arg maxaD E
aD
st (H
t), where EaDst (H
t) is the
expected cumulative reward for the defender, D, after history H t, including taking action










The set of hypothesized attacker types is given by ΘA and θj is a type within the set.
The posterior P (θj|Ĥ) is the probability of type θj given the history, Ĥ. The set of actions
available to the attacker is denoted by Aj and an action within the set is given by ai. The
mixed-strategy of the attacker is given by πj and returns the probability of the attacker
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selecting action ai if he is type θj. The term Q
aD,i
s (Ĥ) is the expected cumulative reward for















The transition function is given by p(s, aD,i, s
′) and defines the probability of transitioning
from state s to state s′ as a result of action profile aD,i. The set of all states is denoted by
S. The immediate reward function of the defender is given by rD and the discount factor,
β, is applied to the expected cumulative reward.
Assuming the independence of types, we can define the posterior Pj(θj|H t) from
Equation 3.14 as










τ , aτj , θj) (3.17)
Using this formulation for a pure type distribution, HBA will make correct predictions
given sufficient time [4]. There are two caveats to this guarantee. The first caveat is that no
types can be ruled out a priori, i.e., all types must have positive prior beliefs. The second
caveat is that although HBA is guaranteed to make correct predictions, it is not guaranteed
to learn the true type distribution. This is because some types may not be distinguishable
by their strategies. An example of such a type distribution can be found in [4].
Using HBA can be computationally expensive for complicated SBGs. The computation
time for implementing the recursive HBA algorithm is exponentially related to the number
of types, actions, and states in the game [4]. One way to address this challenge is by
implementing stochastic sampling methods in the HBA algorithm [5]. HBA with stochastic












QaD,is (Ĥ, wi) (3.18)








A path is denoted by wi, the set of all sampled paths is denoted by W , and the number
of sampled paths is nW . A path is the same structure as H; it is defined by a sequence of
states and the action profiles occurring in those states. The states and actions used in Q are
defined by the path. The values Pj(θj|H t) and L(H t|θj) are given by Equations 3.16 and
3.17, respectively.
3.4.3 Application of SBGs to Cybersecurity Decisions
In this work, we use an SBG to analyze a cybersecurity scenario for an NPP system. The
players are a defender and an attacker. The defender is unsure about the characteristics of
the attacker, and constructs a set of types to model the attacker’s behavior. The defender
makes cybersecurity decisions and the attacker chooses offensive actions to damage the NPP.
As the players take action, the SBG transitions among a set of states that describe the state of
the NPP and its ICS devices. Over time, the defender makes inferences about the attacker’s
characteristics using approximate Bayesian updating. Given his updated beliefs about the
attacker’s characteristics, the defender uses HBA to select the optimal cybersecurity strategy
to maximize his cumulative utility,
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Probability = 1− p
Y Z
W e,E f, F
X g,G h,H
Harsanyi-Transformed Game
Y Y Y Z ZY ZZ
W pa+ (1− p)e, pa+ (1− p)f, pb+ (1− p)e, pb+ (1− p)f,
pA+ (1− p)E pA+ (1− p)F pB + (1− p)E pB + (1− p)F
X pc+ (1− p)g, pc+ (1− p)h, pd+ (1− p)g, pd+ (1− p)h,
pC + (1− p)G pC + (1− p)H pD + (1− p)G pD + (1− p)H
Normal State Penetrated State Damaged State
Figure 4: A simple stochastic security game.
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(a) Prior belief over p.
(b) Belief regarding the action as a function
of p.
(c) Polynomial product of the prior and the
action belief.
(d) The posterior belief over p.
Figure 5: Approximate Bayesian updating example.
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4.0 Construction of the Stochastic Bayesian Game
Constructing an SBG is not a trivial task. In this chapter, we discuss several tools that
can be used by cybersecurity teams to construct an SBG. These are existing tools in the
fields of nuclear engineering, cybersecurity, and risk analysis, but their application to the
construction of an SBG is new.
First, the system under consideration must be defined and understood. In this work, we
study the residual heat removal system of a boiling water reactor. We present an overview of
a boiling water reactor, the residual heat removal system, and their functional requirements.
Second, we identify the players who interact with the system. We define the plant
defender and identify the priorities of the defender. We also characterize the threats against
the NPP using Intel Corporation’s Threat Agent Risk Assessment. This methodology is a
tool used to identify the threat agents who pose the greatest risk to a computer system. The
threat agents are modelled as attacker types in the SBG.
Third, we define the state space of the game. The states describe the environment for
the players’ interactions. To define the states we use System-Theoretic Process Analysis.
System-Theoretic Process Analysis is a risk assessment tool that examines the functional
interactions between components and the environment to prevent losses.
Fourth, we define the actions available to each player at each state in the game. For the
defender, actions include defensive cybersecurity controls such as implementing a firewall or
disabling a device’s wireless capabilities. For the attacker, actions include cyber attacks such
as malicious code injection via a USB drive. Each attacker type may have a different set of
available actions at some or all of the states.
Fifth, we define the transition probabilities between the states. These probabilities are
dependent on the actions chosen by the players. To define the transition probabilities, we use
the NIST Common Vulnerability Scoring System and event tree analysis. The NIST Common
Vulnerability Scoring System is used to quantify the risk posed by a given vulnerability.
Event tree analysis is used to identify the probability of several outcomes given the occurrence
of an initiating event such as a cyber attack.
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Sixth, we define the utility functions for both players. The immediate utility functions
define the rewards earned by the players after each time step of the game. Immediate utilities
are a function of the actions chosen by both players and the state history. A cumulative
utility function aggregates the immediate utilities over the course of the game.
Seventh, we define the decision algorithms used by the players. There are three com-
ponents to the defender’s decision-making: Bayesian learning of the attacker’s parameters,
estimation of the attacker’s true type, and HBA to select an action. The attacker uses a
single decision algorithm to select an action.
4.1 The Residual Heat Removal System
The SBG approach will be demonstrated on a subsystem of a boiling water reactor
(BWR). A diagram of a BWR is shown in Figure 6. Coolant is pumped through the reactor
vessel to remove heat from the nuclear fuel in the reactor core. The coolant is passed
through moisture separators and the resulting steam is passed through a turbine to generate
electricity. The steam is condensed by a heat sink such as a cooling tower and pumped back
through the reactor vessel. Control rods are used to control the power of the core. The
reactor vessel is surrounded by a containment building to prevent the release of radioactive
material.
An SBG will be used to study the cybersecurity of the BWR’s residual heat removal
(RHR) system. The RHR system is used for both cooling and reactor vessel coolant inventory
control. An overview of the RHR system is shown in Figure 7. The RHR system consists of
two interconnected systems that are nearly identical. System I is on the left side of Figure 7
and System II is on the right. Motor-operated valves (MOVs) are implemented in both
systems. MOVs that are normally closed are shaded and MOVs that are normally open are
not shaded. Each system contains two pumps, a heat exchanger, and the necessary piping,
valves, and instrumentation [83, 30].
The RHR has six operational modes, but for this case study we analyze the low pressure


































































Figure 7: Residual heat removal (RHR) system.
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cladding temperature from exceeding 1,204 ◦C during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
Following a LOCA, LPCI mode cools the fuel by maintaining water level in the reactor
vessel. RHR pumps draw water from the suppression pool and feed it to the reactor vessel
through the recirculation system piping. Two out of four RHR pumps must inject after a
design-basis LOCA to provide sufficient cooling [30].
LPCI mode can be initiated manually or automatically. LPCI mode is initiated
automatically by one-out-of-two-twice logic for either low reactor water level or high drywell
pressure. This means that water level and drywell pressure are each measured by four
independent sensors. The four sensors are configured as two pairs. To automatically initiate
LPCI mode, one sensor from each pair must measure the initiating signal [30].
The sequence of LPCI mode operations are:
1. LPCI mode initiation signal is generated by low reactor water level or high drywell
pressure.
2. RHR pumps A, B, and C start two seconds after the LPCI initiation signal.
3. RHR pump D starts seven seconds after the LPCI initiation signal to prevent overloading
of the bus.
4. The valves in the suction path between the RHR pumps and suppression pool are
normally open, so no action is required. These valves are 31A, B, C, and D.
5. The containment spray and test isolation valves close so that the RHR pumps discharge
to the recirculation system. These valves are 38A and B, 39A and B, 40A and B, 41A
and B, and 42A and B.
6. Minimum flow valves close when LPCI injection flow exceeds a threshold. These valves
are 45A and B.
7. The heat exchanger bypass valves open and cannot be closed for three minutes. These
valves are 34A and B.
8. The LPCI injection valves open when the reactor vessel pressure drops below a threshold.
These valves are 37A and B. Valves 36A and B are normally open, so no action is required.
9. The recirculation pump discharge valves close once reactor pressure has dropped below
a threshold. These valves are DV-A and DV-B.















Figure 8: Network topology of the RHR system.
Hazards are conditions that can cause losses under certain circumstances. Hazards are
discussed in greater detail during our discussion of System-Theoretic Process Analysis in
Section 4.3.1. We consider the following hazards for the RHR system in LPCI mode.
H1: Loss of flow path alignment capability to RHR subsystems
H2: Damage to (or loss of) RHR pumps
H3: Excessive removal of suppression pool inventory
H4: Reactor trip
H5: RHR does not initiate
H6: Inadequate flow for intended operation
H7: Cooling provided via RHR while reactor is at-power
The network topology used in this case study is shown in Figure 8. In this topology, the
RHR system is controlled by four programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that communicate
over a network switch. For each RHR system, one PLC controls the pumps and one PLC
controls the valves.
To accomplish their goals, the threat agents could choose to target one or more of the
devices shown in the RHR network topology. After deriving the goals and capabilities of the
threat agents, the SBG approach will be used to select an optimal defense strategy.
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4.2 The Players
The SBG is played by two players: a defender and an attacker. The defender is a
multidisciplinary cybersecurity team at the NPP. Although the attacker is modelled as
a single player, the construction of the SBG enables the analysis of the full spectrum of
adversaries. The following sections describe each player in greater detail.
4.2.1 The Defender
The defender is a nuclear power plant cybersecurity team. The cybersecurity team should
be multidisciplinary and be involved in the design of the SBG. Relevant fields include system
theory, risk analysis, nuclear engineering, industrial control systems, security engineering,
financial engineering, threat analysis, artificial intelligence, and game theory. Each of these
fields provides essential input to the game-theoretic approach.
Expertise in threat analysis, cybsersecurity, and security engineering is useful in the
definition of the attacker. NPPs face a variety of hostile threat agents and an understanding
of the threats is necessary to define attacker types in the SBG. In this work, we use Intel
Corporation’s Threat Agent Risk Assessment to identify the threats to the NPP and to select
the threat agents who pose the greatest risk to the NPP.
Expertise in system theory, industrial control systems, and risk analysis is useful in the
construction of the stochastic state space. System-Theoretic Process Analysis will be used
to define the states of the SBG. System-Theoretic Process Analysis is a risk assessment
tool that examines the functional interactions between components and the environment to
prevent damage to the system. This tool enables us to identify ways that the attacker might
damage the NPP and allows us to construct a state space that includes those scenarios.
Expertise in risk analysis, nuclear engineering, and mechanical engineering is useful in
the definition of state transition functions. Some state transition functions will be defined
using event tree analysis. Event tree analysis defines the probability of several outcomes
given the occurrence of an initiating event. In this case, the initiating event is a cyber attack
and the outcome is damage to the NPP.
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Expertise in industrial control systems, security engineering, and cybersecurity is useful
in the definition of action sets for the players. At each state in the SBG, both players have
a set of actions from which to choose. For the defender, these actions may include actions
such as configuring firewalls or installing antivirus software. For the attacker, these actions
can include eavesdropping attacks or modifying functions on programmable logic controllers.
Expertise in these fields is necessary to understand what actions are available to the attacker
and how we might defend against them.
Expertise in financial engineering, cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, and threat analysis
is useful in the definition of utility functions for both players. As the players take action
in the SBG, they earn immediate utilities that are a function of the action taken and the
resulting state transition. Those immediate utilities are then aggregated by a cumulative
utility function that guides the long-term behavior of the players throughout the game.
Expertise in these fields is necessary to accurately quantify the costs and benefits of the
players’ actions.
Expertise in the fields of artificial intelligence and game theory is required to construct
the SBG and optimize the defender’s actions. The construction of the SBG involves elements
of both stochastic and Bayesian game theory. Rather than use traditional Nash equilibrium
solution methods, we use Harsanyi-Bellman ad hoc coordination. Harsanyi-Bellman ad hoc
coordination is an artificial intelligence method that combines the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
and Bellman optimal control to optimize the defender’s actions as the game is played.
The goal of the defender is to maintain normal operation of the plant and to prevent the
occurrence of losses. Losses are events that are unacceptable to plant stakeholders. Losses
are discussed in greater detail during our discussion of System-Theoretic Process Analysis
in Section 4.3.1. The defender’s losses are:
L1: Loss of power generation Since 1990, nuclear energy has generated approximately
20% of the net electricity generation in the United States [87]. To continue meeting this
demand and to maintain a high capacity factor, outages at NPP must be minimized.
Some power outages are necessary for the NPP to refuel and perform inspection and
maintenance activities. Refueling occurs every 18 to 24 months. Planned outages
normally occur in the fall and spring when there is lower demand for electricity [86].
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Some guidelines have been published to optimize planned NPP outages [45]. Unplanned
outages should be minimized. Both planned and unplanned outages have a significant
financial impact on the NPP. Revenue is lost because the NPP is not generating power.
The NPP must also buy power to replace the power that it would typically generate. The
NPP also continues to pay employees and usually hires additional specialized workers to
perform maintenance activities. A cyber attack that causes a loss of power generation
at an NPP would have a severe financial impact.
L2: Environmental damage Accidents at NPPs have the potential to cause significant
environmental damage, despite defense in depth design. Defense in depth is a design
approach that includes multiple redundant and independent safety features to prevent
and mitigate accidents [95]. The main benefit of defense in depth approaches is that no
one safety feature is solely responsible for ensuring NPP safety. For example, there are
multiple layers of protection to prevent the release of radioactive materials from the NPP.
These layers are the fuel matrix, the fuel cladding, the reactor vessel, and the containment
system. Even with a defense in depth approach, it is possible for radioactive materials
to be released during an accident. A cyber attack on an NPP that defeats defense in
depth safety systems could cause similar environmental damages.
L3: Personnel injury or death Personnel safety is highly valued by the nuclear power
industry. Several organizations such as the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Agency have
published guidelines for developing a safety culture at NPPs [38, 74, 46, 42]. The injury
or death of an NPP employee is a rare and significant accident. The industrial safety
accident rate for the U.S. nuclear industry is shown in Figure 9 [64]. The injury or death
of an NPP employee due to a cyber attack would be a significant event.
L4: Damaged public opinion According to a 2019 poll, 49% of U.S. adults support
nuclear power, 49% oppose nuclear power, and 47% believe nuclear power is safe [70].
Polls have shown that public opinion of nuclear energy can be negatively related to the
occurrence of accidents at NPPs. Table 5 shows U.S. adults’ support for constructing
nuclear power plants in their area, before and after the Three Mile Island accident in
March 1979 [72]. Although no deaths occurred as a result of the accident, public opinion
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Figure 9: U.S. nuclear industry safety accident rate [64]. The industry safety accident rate
is the number of accidents resulting in lost work, restricted work, or fatalities per 200,000
worker hours.
of nuclear energy worsened. A successful cyber attack on an NPP may have a similar
affect on public opinion. Damaged public opinion could be costly to the nuclear power
industry because public opinion is connected to government policy. Negative public
opinion could lead to over-regulation or a reduction of the nuclear industry’s share of
total energy generation.
L5: Major equipment damage Major equipment damage can have severe financial
consequences for an NPP. Several NPP have shut down because of equipment repair
costs [10]. For example, Crystal River 3 shut down in February 2013 after 36 years of
operation because of the high cost of containment repairs. San Ofre 2 and San Ofre 3
shut down in June 2013 after 30 and 29 years of operation because of the high cost of
replacing new steam generators. Equipment damage caused by a cyber attack could have
a similar financial impact on an NPP.
L6: Core damage Core damage is a serious event that can be coupled with the release of
radioactive materials [43]. An example of an NPP accident causing core damage is the
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Table 5: U.S. adults’ support for constructing nuclear power plants in their area, before and
after the Three Mile Island accident in March 1979 [72].
Opinion Jun. 11-14, 1976 Apr. 6-9, 1979
Against 45% 60%
Not against 42% 33%
No opinion 13% 7%
Three Mile Island (TMI) accident [106, 82]. High fuel temperatures and oxidation of the
fuel cladding caused much of the fuel in the core to melt. Because of severe core damage,
the disassembling and defueling procedures had to be significantly modified [23]. Around
100,000 kg of damaged fuel had to be removed from the reactor vessel [106]. The clean-up
of the damaged reactor station cost required more than 1,000 workers, took nearly 12
years, and cost approximately $973 million [106]. Core damage caused by a cyber attack
could have a similar impact.
L7: Loss of sensitive data The NPP is responsible for protecting various data from
unauthorized disclosure. This data is pertinent to national security interests, the
protection of radioactive materials, and other sensitive information. Requirements for
controlling this data are specified in various federal regulations. Three types of data are
protected by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [94].
Classified information Classified information pertinent to NPP is usually one of two
types. The first type is national security information (NSI). NSI is information that
is classified by an executive order and must be protected to preserve national security.
The second type is restricted data (RD). RD is information that is classified by the
Atomic Energy Act [93] and must be protected to prevent the development or use of
nuclear weapons. Requirements for access to this data and information safeguarding
are given in 10 CFR §25 and 10 CFR §95 [98, 96].
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Table 6: Losses and their assigned consequence magnitudes.
Loss Description Consequence ($)
L1 Loss of power generation −2× 106
L2 Environmental damages −1× 1011
L3 Personnel injury −3× 106
L4 Damaged public opinion −7× 105
L5 Major equipment damage −4× 107
L6 Core damage −1× 108
L7 Loss of sensitive data −1× 106
Safeguard information (SGI) This is a type of sensitive unclassified information
required to be protected under Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act [93]. It is
pertinent to the physical protection of operating power reactors and other radioactive
material. Performance requirements for the protection of SGI are specified in 10 CFR
§73.21 [99], and specific requirements for the protection of safeguards information
are specified in 10 CFR §73.22 and 10 CFR §73.23 [100, 101].
Sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI) This is a type of
information that is not publicly available and is not related to nuclear safeguards.
Some examples are personal and private information and proprietary information.
Any information related to the protection or accounting of special nuclear material
that is not designated NSI, RD, or SGI must be protected as specified in 10 CFR
§2.390 [97].
The consequence magnitude for each loss is given in Table 6. This is a number that
captures the impact of the loss to the defender. We define the unit of the loss magnitude
to be dollars. In this work we assume that environmental damages and personnel injury are
the most severe losses and we assume that damaged public opinion and loss of sensitive data
are the least severe losses.
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It is important to clearly define the defender’s losses before defining the attacker types.
Different attacker types may have different capacities to cause losses, and each may care
about causing different losses. In the following section, we select the attacker types by
considering their capacity and desire to cause losses for the NPP.
4.2.2 The Attacker
The attacker’s types can be defined using a threat taxonomy. Several taxonomies have
been created to describe cyber-threats. First, the International Atomic Energy Agency
created a list of internal and external threats to nuclear facilities and defined their resources,
time span of attack, tools used, and motivations [44]. Second, the United States Defense
Science Board has created a tiered threat taxonomy system that describes threats in terms of
their financial resources, skill, and potential impact [20]. Third, Intel Corporation compiled
a Threat Agent Library (TAL) that defines 21 unique threat agents [39]. In this work, we
use Intel’s TAL.
After selecting a threat taxonomy, we must assess the risk each threat agent poses to the
NPP. Each threat agent has specific motivations, goals, and capabilities defined by the TAL.
Additionally, each defender type also has specific priorities regarding consequence prevention.
Using this information, we estimate the risk posed by each threat agent to the NPP and
each defender type, and identify the agents who pose the greatest risk for each type. In
this work, we use Intel’s Threat Agent Risk Assessment (TARA) methodology to select the
critical threat agents. Each of the critical threat agents are modelled as a type in the SBG.
4.2.2.1 Threat Agent Library The hostile threat agents in Intel’s TAL are given in
Table 7. Each threat agent is defined by nine attributes: intent, access, outcome, limits,
resource, skill level, objective, visibility, and motivation [39, 41].
Intent This attribute defines whether the threat agent is malicious.
Hostile An agent with hostile intent deliberately intends to harm the NPP. We only
consider hostile threat agents in this work.
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Non-hostile An agent with non-hostile intent accidentally harms the NPP. The
non-hostile agents in the TAL are reckless employees, untrained employees, and
information partners.
Access This attribute defines the scope of the threat agent’s access to the NPP.
Internal These threat agents have internal access to the NPP.
External These threat agents have external access to the NPP.
Outcome This attribute defines the primary goal of the agent.
Theft An agent with the theft outcome seeks to steal assets from the NPP.
Business advantage An agent with the business advantage outcome seeks to develop
a competitive advantage over the NPP in the marketplace.
Damage An agent with the damage outcome seeks to cause harm to NPP employees,
NPP assets, or the general public.
Embarrassment An agent with the embarrassment outcome seeks to portray the NPP
negatively to the public.
Technical advantage An agent with the technical advantage outcome seeks to develop
technical capability using resources developed or implemented by the NPP.
Limits This attribute defines the limitations that constrain the threat agent.
Code of conduct An agent with code of conduct limits follows a code of conduct that
exceeds relevant laws and statutes. This limit only applies to non-hostile threat
agents, therefore it is not used in this work.
Legal An agent with legal limits follows relevant laws and statutes.
Extra-legal (minor) An agent with minor extra-legal limits may commit minor or
non-violent crimes.
Extra-legal (major) An agent with major extra-legal limits may commit major crimes
resulting in significant damage.
Resource This attribute defines the resources available for the threat agent to conduct an
attack on the NPP.
Individual An agent with individual resources acts independently.
Club An agent with club resources is a part of a social group.
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Contest An agent with contest resources is acting as a part of a short-term event with
a particular goal.
Team An agent with team resources is part of a formally organized group.
Organization An agent with organization resources is a part of a group larger than a
team with greater resources.
Government An agent with government resources has control over public assets and
is highly resourced.
Skill level This attributes defines the abilities of the threat agent.
None An agent with no skill has no expertise regarding the NPP or cybersecurity.
Minimal An agent with minimal skill can use existing techniques to target the NPP.
Operational An agent with an operational skill level understands the technical domain
of the NPP and and can create new attacks.
Adept An agent with an adept skill level is an expert in the technical domain of the
NPP and can create sophisticated new attacks.
Objective This attribute defines the method by which the agent intends to achieve his
outcome. An agent can have multiple objectives.
Copy This objective is to replicate an NPP asset.
Deny This objective is to prevent the use of an NPP asset.
Destroy This objective is to destroy an NPP asset, rendering it unusable.
Injure This objective is to damage an NPP asset, thereby reducing its functionality.
Take This objective is to steal an NPP asset.
Don’t care The “don’t care” objective means that the agent either makes opportunis-
tic decisions or does not have a preference for which objectives are achieved. The
cyber vandal, irrational individual, radical activist, and sensationalist were assigned
the “don’t care” objective in the TAL. Rather than creating a separate category of
“don’t care” for these agents, we represent them as having all five of the remaining
objectives.
Visibility This attribute defines the agent’s efforts to conceal his identity.
Overt An overt agent does not attempt to conceal the attack or his identity.
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Covert A covert agent does not attempt to conceal the attack, but does attempt to
conceal his identity.
Clandestine A clandestine agent attempts to conceal both the attack and his identity.
Don’t care An agent who doesn’t care either does not have a plan or does not have a
preference regarding secrecy.
Motivation This attribute defines both the agent’s cause for targeting the NPP and the
agent’s drive. Each agent has a defining motivation, but several agents also have a co-
motivation, subordinate motivation, binding motivation, or personal motivation. In this
work, we only consider the defining motivation for each threat agent.
Accidental An agent with this motivation does not intend to damage the NPP. This
motivation applies to non-hostile threat agents and is not used in this work.
Coercion An agent with this motivation is manipulated to target the NPP on behalf
of another party.
Disgruntlement An agent with this motivation seeks revenge against the NPP for
prior perceived mistreatment.
Dominance An agent with this motivation seeks to establish superiority over the NPP.
Ideology An agent with this motivation targets the NPP to express a set of core beliefs.
Notoriety An agent with this motivation targets the NPP to achieve fame.
Organizational gain An agent with this motivation targets the NPP for the benefit
of the agent’s business or organization.
Personal financial gain An agent with this motivation targets the NPP for monetary
compensation.
Personal satisfaction An agent with this motivation targets the NPP for personal
pride or fulfillment.
Unpredictable An agent with this motivation targets the NPP without an identifiable
cause or structure.
4.2.2.2 Threat Agent Risk Assessment We select the relevant threat agents from the
TAL using Intel Corporation’s Threat Agent Risk Assessment (TARA) methodology [40].
The TARA methodology is shown in Figure 10 and described below.
55
Table 7: Hostile agents from Intel Corporation’s Threat Agent Library [39]
Threat Agent Description
Anarchist Individual who rejects structure
Civil activist Non-violent supporter of a cause
Competitor Business rival
Corrupt government official Abuser of political power
Cyber vandal Thrill-seeker without strong agenda
Data miner External individual who gathers data
Disgruntled employee Current or former employee with malicious intent
Government cyberwarrior State-sponsored attacker with significant resources
Government spy State-sponsored trusted insider
Internal spy Insider gathering data for profit
Irrational individual Individual without a rational plan
Legal adversary Opponent in legal proceedings
Mobster Participant in organized crime
Radical activist Destructive supporter of a cause
Sensationalist Fame-seeker
Terrorist Person using violence to advance a socio-political agenda
Thief Intends to steal for profit
Vendor Business partner seeking competitive advantage
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1. Measure current threat agent risks
2. Distinguish threats that exceed acceptable risk
3. Derive primary objectives of those threat agents
4. Identify methods likely to manifest
5. Determine the most important collective exposures
6. Align strategy to target the most significant exposures
Figure 10: Intel Corporation’s Threat Agent Risk Assessment [40].
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The first step of TARA is to measure current threat agent risks to the NPP. This step is
an initial assessment of the risk of each threat agent to the NPP. This assessment is based on
expert opinion and is conducted for each threat agent in the TAL. TARA does not specify
the method to determine each agent’s risk. To determine a threat agent’s risk, we must first
determine which losses are desired by the agent. To determine each agent’s desired losses,
we consider their motivations, limits, visibility, and desired outcomes. Table 8 summarizes
this process for each threat agent.
TARA does not specify the method to determine each agent’s risk. To calculate the
risk posed by a threat agent, we use the traditional definition of risk as the product of





The consequences are the defender’s losses. The assumed loss consequences used in this work
are given in Table 6.
The likelihood is the probability that the threat agent in question could cause that loss
and is based on expert opinion. To estimate these likelihoods, we consider the threat agent’s
access, resources, skill level, access, and visibility. Agents with internal access, organization
and government resources, operational and adept skill level, and overt visibility receive the
greatest likelihoods. The risk posed by each threat agent is calculated using equation 4.1,
the estimated likelihoods, and loss magnitudes given in Table 6. Table 9 summarizes this
process for each threat agent.
An asterisk superscript in Table 9 indicates that the parameter differs from the original
definition in the TAL. The disgruntled employee, government cyberwarrior, and irrational
individual were assigned visibility of “Multiple/Don’t Care” in the TAL. For simplicity,
we have assigned one visibility category for each agent. The disgruntled employee and
government cyberwarrior are assigned a visibility of “Covert” and the irrational individual is
assigned a visibility of “Overt”. In this work, the club and contest resources are consolidated
into one club category. This change only affects the cyber vandal.
The second step of TARA is to distinguish threat agents that exceed baseline acceptable




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































expert opinion and threat intelligence. One way to determine the acceptable risk baseline is to
consider only the loss with the greatest consequence. Next, identify the maximum allowable
probability for that loss. Because the worst loss was assigned a consequence magnitude of
one, the acceptable risk baseline is then the product of the loss consequence and maximum
allowable probability.
Alternative approaches to distinguishing the high-risk threat agents involve measuring
their relative risk. The preferable selection method is defining a risk threshold, but these
methods can be used if a risk threshold cannot be determined. Some examples are:
• Select the threat agents with risk greater than a given percentage of the risk of the most
significant threat agent.
• Calculate the total risk posed by all threat agents. Select the threat agents with the
highest scores that make up a given percentage of the total risk.
• Approximate the total risk posed by all threat agents as the sum of the risk posed by
all agents except the least significant agent. Calculate the percent error between the
approximated total risk and the total risk including all threat agents. If the percent
error is below a given threshold, repeat for the next least significant threat agent and
calculate the percent error between the new approximated total and the total from the
previous iteration. Repeat until the percent error exceeds the threshold.
The risk of each threat agent is plotted in Figure 11. In this case, one group of threat
agents clearly poses the greatest risk. The risks of the radical activist, disgruntled employee,
government cyberwarrior, and terrorist exceed the next threat agent by approximately three
orders of magnitude. An acceptable risk baseline between $2.7 × 106 and $5.0 × 108 would
result in the selection of these threat agents.
Although the four threat agents have varying motivations, they all seek the outcome of
causing damage, and three of the four also seek to cause embarrassment. Three of the threat
agents also have major extra-legal limits. This combination of outcomes and limitations
leads all four of the selected threat agents to desire all of the defender’s losses. This alone
does not lead to their high risk levels. The skill and resources of these threat agents are also
significant. The radical activist, government cyberwarrior, and terrorist all have adept skill
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Figure 11: Threat agent risks on logarithmic scale.
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levels, and at least organization resources. In comparison, the disgruntled employee has an
operational skill level and individual resources, but still poses a significant risk because of
his internal access.
The attacker’s types and their loss magnitudes are given in Table 10. All of the attacker’s
types seek to cause each of the NPP losses, so all of the attacker’s loss magnitudes are greater
than zero. Note that the attacker’s loss magnitudes do not need to be directly correlated
with the defender’s loss magnitudes. We have assumed these values based on the motivations
and desired outcomes of the threat agents as defined by the TAL. These values are assumed
for demonstration purposes. In practice, additional threat intelligence should also be used.
The third step of TARA is to derive primary objectives of those threat agents. The
primary objectives are a combination of the threat agent’s motivations and capabilities that
are defined by the TAL. This step was completed in the first step when we identified each
threat agent’s desired losses in Table 8.
The fourth step of TARA is to identify methods likely to manifest. A method is a
combination of threat agent objectives and the means by which the threat seeks to accomplish
them. These methods are used to define the actions available to the threat agents at each
state in the SBG. This step is not necessary for the selection of attacker types for the SBG,
but will be done in conjunction with System Theoretic Process Analysis as the states of the
SBG are defined.
The fifth step of TARA is to determine the most important collective exposures. The
exposures are the intersection of attack vectors and the methods likely to manifest. This
step is not necessary for the selection of attacker types for the SBG, but it is mentioned
because its purpose is addressed later in game construction using System Theoretic Process
Analysis.
The sixth step of TARA is to align strategy to target the most significant exposures.
This is the decision-making portion of TARA. This step is not necessary for the selection of
attacker types, but it is mentioned because its purpose is addressed by applying Harsanyi-
Bellman ad hoc coordination to the SBG.
Each selected threat agent is modelled as a type in the SBG. Recall that a type is










































































































































































































































governing another player. The types characterize the attributes of the threat as defined
by the TAL. At each state in the SBG, both players choose from a set of actions. For the
defender, these strategies include sets of cyber components to be defended, and the means by
which they are defended. For the attacker, these actions include sets of cyber components to
be attacked, and the means by which they are attacked. The actions available to the players
are defined using System Theoretic Process Analysis in Section 4.3. As a result of the actions
that are selected and the resulting state transition, each player receives an immediate reward.
The immediate rewards are aggregated over the course of the game by a cumulative reward
function. The reward functions of each type are a function of the threat agent’s resources,
capabilities, and motivations. The reward functions for each type are defined in Section 4.6.
In this section, we identified the players of the SBG. The defender’s capabilities
were defined and the defender’s losses were identified and prioritized. Portions of Intel
Corporation’s TARA methodology were used to define the attacker types. The threat agent
attributes defined in the TAL were used to identify losses of interest to each agent and to
calculate the risk posed to the NPP by each agent.
The disgruntled employee, government spy, radical activist, government cyberwarrior,
terrorist, and corrupt government official were as the critical threat agents. The majority
of these threat agents seek to cause all of the potential losses to the system, thus increasing
their estimated risk. The majority of these threat agents have major extra-legal limits,
organization or government resources, and adept skill level. The visibility of the agents
varies. It is also noteworthy that the two agents with the greatest risk have internal access
to the NPP. This resulted in a greater estimated probability of those agents to successfully
cause a loss. Each of the selected threat agents are modelled as types in the SBG.
4.2.3 The Type Distribution
Now that the attacker’s types have been defined, we must define their probability
distributions. In practice, these distributions should be estimated from threat intelligence
data. Data of importance include the global political climate, known threat agent activity,
insider information, and recent threats to the NPP.
65










p(θjA) 0.15 0.35 0.30 0.20
For this case study, we assume the type distributions in Table 11. We assume the
defender assigns the greatest probability to the disgruntled employee type, followed by the
government cyberwarrior, terrorist, and radical activist.
This distribution is the defender’s initial estimate of the probability distribution over the
attacker’s types. As the SBG is played, the defender can use Bayesian learning to update
the type distribution. The updated distribution is then used in HBA to select the optimal
cybersecurity strategy given the defender’s beliefs about the attacker.
4.3 Stochastic State Space
In an SBG, the states define the setting of the players’ interactions. The stochastic state
space must characterize the plant over the operating range of consideration and throughout
the course of all postulated attacks. For complex systems with many digital devices, the
unaltered state space may be too large for the security game to be tractable. For example,
consider a system with 25 components, each of which has two operational states: operational
or nonoperational. For this system, there would be a minimum of 225 = 33, 554, 432 states
corresponding to each possible combination of the individual components’ operational states.
A large state space presents challenges both in computation and in interpretation of results.
Thus, a method is needed to constrain the size of the stochastic state space.
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4.3.1 System-Theoretic Process Analysis
System-theoretic process analysis (STPA) can be used to manage the size of the stochastic
state space. STPA is a hazard analysis technique that considers both component failures
and unsafe interactions of system components to model accident causation [52]. STPA has
been applied to study a variety of cyber-physical systems including offshore supply vessel
positioning systems [2], buoy tender control systems [77], and railroad systems [21]. STPA
has also been applied to nuclear systems as part of Hazards and Consequences Analysis of
Digital Systems (HAZCADS) [24].
The application of STPA to the construction of an SBG is summarized in the following
four steps.
Step 1: Define the Purpose of Analysis This step involves three sub-tasks: identify-
ing losses, identifying system-level hazards, and identifying system-level constraints.
Losses are consequences that are unacceptable to stakeholders. These losses may be
aligned with the goals of the attacker. Losses may involve environmental conditions that
cannot be controlled. We have already defined the losses in Section 4.2.1.
Hazards are system states that will lead to at least one loss if a specific set of
environmental conditions are met. A system boundary should be defined to separate
the system from its environment. The system is typically defined to include all aspects
over which the system designers can exert control. Hazards specify an overall system
state and do not refer to specific system components. The RHR hazards that we will
consider in this work are listed in our description of the RHR system in Section 4.1.
Constraints are conditions that must be met to prevent hazards. Each constraint must
be traceable to at least one hazard. Constraints are often the inverse of the hazard. An
example of a constraint for a nuclear power plant is to initiate the RHR system at the
correct time. This constraint prevents the hazard of the RHR failing to initiate. The
other RHR constraints follow a similar structure. For brevity, we do not list all of the
RHR constraints here.
Step 2: Model the control structure The control structure is a functional model of the
interactions of the controllers with the controlled process through feedback and control
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Table 12: Hacked devices and potential hazards.
PLC-1A & PLC-2A &
PLC-1A PLC-1B PLC-2A PLC-2B Switch PLC-1B PLC-2B
H1 X X X
H2 X X X X X
H3 X X X
H4 X X X
H5 X X X
H6 X X X X X
H7 X X X
actions. In this case, the network topology in Figure 8 is an adequate model of the control
structure. A more detailed model may be required for more complex control structures.
Step 3: Identify the unsafe control actions Unsafe control actions (UCAs) are con-
trol actions that can lead to a hazard under certain conditions. A UCA describes the
source of the control action, the type of control action, and the context of the control
action. STPA is used primarily as a risk analysis tool to study unintended malfunctions
of digital control systems. In contrast, we are applying STPA to study the deliberate
attack of a digital control system by a malicious actor. We recognize that the purpose of
defining UCAs is to understand the events that may lead to hazards. To meet this goal,
we list the sets of penetrated devices that may cause hazards under certain conditions.
Table 12 shows which hazards can occur as a consequence of different combinations of
hacked devices. We do not list every action profile leading to each hazard because there
are multiple ways some devices can be hacked. For example, loss of flow path alignment
(H1) may occur if the defender does not disable wireless on PLC-1B, and the attacker
chooses to conduct a wireless exploit on PLC-1B. This action profile reflects the attacker’s
capability to cause a failure, but does not specify the specific method used to cause the
failure. For example, an attacker with administrator privileges on PLC-1B could choose












Figure 12: Generalized state space of an SBG.
Step 4: Identify loss scenarios. A loss scenario summarizes the events that can lead to
hazards. These scenarios capture the evolution of NPP operation from a normal state
to a loss state. The stochastic state space is developed based on the loss scenarios.
The generalized stochastic state space is shown in Figure 12. The game originates in a
normal state where the plant is operating as intended. From the normal state, the attacker
may be able to breach the plant’s defenses and cause the game to enter a penetrated state.
From a penetrated state, the attacker may be able to cause a hazard, or the attacker may need
to escalate his privileges within the plant before causing a hazard. If certain environmental
conditions occur, the game may transition from a hazard state to a loss state. Most losses
are represented by absorbing states; when they are reached, the game concludes. Some losses
may not necessitate the end of the game, in which case, they are not assigned a separate
state. At all of the non-absorbing states, the defender may be able to cause the game to
transition back to the normal state.
There are a total of 45 states in the SBG. A full list of states is given in Table 13. We
use one normal state to represent standard operation of the RHR system. There are 31
penetrated states where the attacker has compromised various sets of ICS devices. There
are 31 penetrated states because there are five ICS devices and we assume that each device is
either penetrated or operating normally (25 − 1 = 31). There are no escalated states in this
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game. There are seven hazard states representing the hazards listed in Section 4.1. There
are six absorbing loss states. Loss of sensitive data (L7) is considered to be a non-terminal
loss, so it are not designated its own states.
4.4 The Actions
Defining the players’ actions requires an understanding of the industrial control system
devices, the RHR system, and the players. An understanding of the control system
devices is required to identify device vulnerabilities, malicious actions that can exploit
those vulnerabilities, and cybersecurity control actions that can address those vulnerabilities.
Knowledge of the RHR system is needed to understand how exploits can lead to negative
consequences in the system. Finally, knowledge about the players is needed to understand
their capabilities and goals. Many considerations about the players have been addressed
using TARA and the type definitions. This sections lists the actions available to the players
at each state in the SBG.
4.4.1 Normal and Penetrated States
The attacker and defender each have several choices to make regarding each component
in the RHR system. For the defender, these choices address the configurations of the
industrial control system devices. For the attacker, these choices address the attack vector
for circumventing the defender’s cybersecurity controls. These choices are available to the
players in the normal and penetrated states. Each choice comes with a cost for that player.
The defender’s choices are given in Table 14 and the attacker’s choices are given in Table 15.
We assume that the default configuration of each PLC is that authentication is off and
wireless communication is enabled. The defender can choose to enable authentication on
each PLC and can choose to disable wireless communication on each PLC. If the defender
has properly enabled authentication, the attacker will not be able to connect to the PLC.
If the defender has properly disabled wireless, the attacker will not be able to conduct the
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Table 13: States in the SBG.
Penetrated Devices




3 Penetrated X X
4 Penetrated X
5 Penetrated X X
6 Penetrated X X
7 Penetrated X X X
8 Penetrated X
9 Penetrated X X
10 Penetrated X X
11 Penetrated X X X
12 Penetrated X X
13 Penetrated X X X
14 Penetrated X X X
15 Penetrated X X X X
16 Penetrated X
17 Penetrated X X
18 Penetrated X X
19 Penetrated X X X
20 Penetrated X X
21 Penetrated X X X
22 Penetrated X X X
23 Penetrated X X X X
24 Penetrated X X
25 Penetrated X X X
26 Penetrated X X X
27 Penetrated X X X X
28 Penetrated X X X
29 Penetrated X X X X
30 Penetrated X X X X
31 Penetrated X X X X X
32 Hazard: H1 — — — — —
33 Hazard: H2 — — — — —
34 Hazard: H3 — — — — —
35 Hazard: H4 — — — — —
36 Hazard: H5 — — — — —
37 Hazard: H6 — — — — —
38 Hazard: H7 — — — — —
39 Loss: L1 — — — — —
40 Loss: L2 — — — — —
41 Loss: L3 — — — — —
42 Loss: L4 — — — — —
43 Loss: L5 — — — — —
44 Loss: L6 — — — — —
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Table 14: The cybersecurity choices available to the defender in the normal and penetrated
states.
PLCs Switch
Action Cost ($) Action Cost ($)
Enable authentication 3× 103 Enable authentication 3× 103
Disable wireless 2× 102 Enable firewall 1× 105
Access control 6× 105
Table 15: The cybersecurity choices available to the attacker in the normal and penetrated
states.
PLCs
Action θ1A Cost ($) θ
2
A Cost ($) θ
3
A Cost ($) θ
4
A Cost ($)
Connect 6.0× 105 1.0× 102 4.0× 104 1.0× 105
Wireless exploit 8.0× 107 7.0× 103 3.0× 107 4.0× 107
Switch
Action θ1A Cost ($) θ
2
A Cost ($) θ
3
A Cost ($) θ
4
A Cost ($)
Connect 6.0× 105 1.0× 102 4.0× 104 1.0× 105
Cyber attack 4.0× 104 2.0× 105 2.0× 104 3.0× 104
Physical attack 2.5× 106 5.0× 103 1.5× 106 2.5× 106
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wireless exploit. The attacker requires local access for the wireless exploit, but does not
require local access to connect with an unsecured PLC. The defender can also choose to
implement access control to restrict who is able to physically access the PLC. If the defender
has properly implemented access control, only approved personnel can access the PLC.
We assume that the default configuration of the switch is that authentication is off,
the firewall is off, and there is no access control. If the defender has properly enabled
authentication, the attacker will not be able to connect to the PLC. The defender can choose
to enable the firewall. In practice, there are many possibilities for firewall configuration, but
here we assume a binary decision to either enable or not enable the firewall. The attacker can
choose whether to attempt an attack. If the defender has enabled the firewall, the attacker
will not be able to conduct the attack. The defender can also choose to implement access
control to restrict who is able to physically access the switch. If the defender has properly
implemented access control, only approved personnel can access the switch.
A complete action for a player consists of selecting an option for each available choice.
This is the most secure action for the defender in the normal state or a penetrated state:
• enable authentication on all of the PLCs
• disable wireless on all of the PLCs
• enable authentication on the switch
• enable the firewall on the switch
• implement access control for the switch
Note that the players are not constrained to make the same choice for all of the PLCs. For
example, the defender could choose to enable authentication on PLC-1A and not enable
authentication on the other PLCs.
In the penetrated states, the attacker and defender also have choices to make that are
not directly related to individual ICS devices. These decisions affect whether the attack
regresses from a penetrated state to the normal state, or whether the attack progresses to a
hazard state.
Penetration recovery In all penetrated states, the defender may attempt to initiate
recovery action. If the recovery is successful, the attacker is expunged from the system
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and the game returns to the normal state. For simplicity, we assume a flat cost of
$1× 106 for recovery from all penetrated states, regardless of the number of devices that
have been penetrated or the manner by which they have been penetrated. This is based
on the assumption that during a known cyber attack, a thorough investigation would be
conducted to examine all potentially affected NPP devices.
Hazard initiation In some penetrated states, the attacker may choose to cause a hazard
to occur. The hazard options are dependent on the devices that are penetrated in that
particular state, as shown in Table 12. We assume that there is no additional cost to the
attacker for allowing a hazard to occur. For simplicity, we assume that the attacker can
only select one hazard at a time.
The defender and attacker both have the option to abstain from any action. We assume
that there is no cost to either player to abstain from action.
4.4.2 Hazard States
In the hazard states, the attacker and defender have choices to make that are not directly
related to individual ICS devices. These decisions affect whether the attack regresses from
a hazard state to the normal state, or whether the attack progresses to a loss state.
Hazard recovery In all hazard states, the defender may attempt to initiate recovery
action. If the recovery is successful, the attacker is expunged from the system and
the game returns to the normal state. For simplicity, we assume a flat cost of $6 × 106
for recovery from all hazard states.
Loss initiation In all hazard states, the attacker may choose to allow a loss to occur.
The potential losses corresponding to each hazard are discussed in greater detail in
Section 4.5. We assume that there is no additional cost to the attacker for allowing a
loss to occur. Unlike the hazard initiation action, we assume that the attacker is only
able to choose whether or not to allow a loss to occur — the attacker is not able to
choose the specific loss. This is because the occurrence of a loss is dependent on other
environmental conditions and safety systems beyond the attacker’s control.
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4.4.3 Loss States
Losses that are modelled as states in the SBG have the most severe consequences. These
loss states are absorbing states. The game ends when an absorbing state is reached, therefore
there are no actions available to either of the players in any of the loss states.
4.5 State Transitions
Now that the states and actions have been defined, we can define the state transition
function. The state transition function is a discrete probability distribution over all of the
states in the SBG. The transition function is dependent on the originating state, the action
chosen by the defender, and the action chosen by the attacker.
We consider four types of transitions in this research: penetration transitions, hazard
transitions, loss transitions, and recovery transitions. Penetration transitions describe the
probability of the attacker breaching NPP defenses to gain access to the system. Hazard
transitions describe the probability of the attacker causing a hazard given his level of access to
the plant. Loss transitions describe the probability that a hazard causes a loss, and accounts
for environmental factors beyond the players’ control. Finally, recovery transitions describe
the probability that the defender returns the game to the normal state from a penetrated or
hazard state.
4.5.1 Penetration Transitions
Penetration transition describe the probability of the attacker penetrating the system,
given the attacker and defender’s actions. Penetration transitions are estimated using the
TAL and the exploitability metrics defined by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
[28]. There are four CVSS metrics:
1. Attack Vector: The attack vector metric measures the context required for an attacker
to exploit a vulnerability. The metric can be assigned values of “Physical” if the attacker
needs to physically interact with the component, “Local” if the the component is not
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Table 16: The success rates of the cybersecurity choices available to the defender in the
normal and penetrated states.
PLCs Switch
Action Rate Action Rate
Enable authentication 0.95 Enable authentication 0.95
Disable wireless 0.99 Enable firewall 0.90
Access control 0.96
bound to the network, “Adjacent” if the component is bound to the network but the
attack is limited at the protocol level to an adjacent topology, or “Network” if the
component is bound to the network and the component is remotely exploitable.
2. Attack Complexity: The attack complexity metric measures the conditions outside of the
attacker’s control that must be met for a vulnerability to be exploited. The metric can
be assigned values of “High” if the attack’s success is dependent on conditions outside
of the attacker’s control, and “Low” if specialized access conditions do not exist.
3. Privileges Required: The privileges required metric measures the privileges the attacker
must have to exploit the vulnerability. The metric can be assigned values of “High” if
the attacker requires administrative privileges over the component, “Low” if the attacker
requires basic user privileges, and “None” if the attacker does not require authorization.
4. User Interaction: The user interaction metric measures whether another user besides the
attacker to participate in the exploitation of the component. The metric can be assigned
values of “Required” or “None”.
The estimated success rates of the defender’s actions are given in Table 16 and the
success rate of the attacker’s actions are given in Table 17. These estimates are dependent
on expert opinion and are an area of ongoing research. These estimates may be validated
using representative capture-the-flag games with cybersecurity professionals.
These success rates are used to calculate the probability of transitioning from one state to
each of the other states given the actions that were chosen. We do this is in three steps. The
first step is to calculate the probability that a given attack vector is successful. The second
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Table 17: The success rates of the cybersecurity choices available to the attacker in the
normal and penetrated states.
PLCs







Connect 0.85 0.99 0.98 0.92
Wireless exploit 0.70 0.85 0.95 0.75
Switch







Connect 0.85 0.99 0.98 0.92
Cyber attack 0.75 0.65 0.97 0.85
Physical attack 0.80 0.98 0.90 0.78
step is to calculate the probability that a component is penetrated given several attempted
attack vectors. The third step is to calculate the probability of transitioning from one state
to another given the devices that are penetrated in those states.
Step 1: Attack vector success Consider an attack action α with success rate pα and a
corresponding defense action, δ, with success rate pδ. In the trivial case that an attack
is not initiated, the probability that the component is penetrated is zero. If an attack is
initiated, there are two possibilities:
1. The first case is that an attack is implemented and the corresponding defense is not
implemented. In this case, the probability that the device is penetrated is equal to
the attack’s success rate, pα.
2. The second case is that an attack is implemented and the corresponding defense is
also implemented. In this case, we assume that the defense and attack actions are
independent and the probability that the device is penetrated is pα(1− pδ).
Step 2: Component penetration There may be multiple attack vectors by which a
component can be penetrated. Consider a component that can be penetrated via any
one of n attack vectors. Let Ai be the event that attack vector i is successful, then
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p(Ai) is the result obtained from the first step. The probability that a component is
penetrated is given by p(
⋃n
i=1 Ai). Using the identity p (
⋃n
i=1 Ai) = 1 − p (
⋂n
i=1 Aci) and
assuming independence of all Ai, the probability that the component will be penetrated
is 1 −
∏n
i=1 p(Aci), where superscript c indicates the complement. The probability that
the component will not be penetrated is trivially
∏n
i=1 p(Aci).
Step 3: State transition We are now able to consider transitions between states. Here
we consider a transition where some components become penetrated. Transitions where
components go from a penetrated status to normal status are addressed in Section 4.5.4.
Consider a transition from state s0 to state s1. Let N be a set of components that go
from a normal status in s0 to a penetrated status in s1, and let M be a set of components
that have normal status in both s0 and s1. Let p(i) be the probability that component i
is penetrated. Assuming all components are independent, the probability of transitioning




j (1 − p(j)). The results from the first and second steps are
substituted into p(i) and p(j) as appropriate.
4.5.2 Hazard Transitions
Hazard transitions describe the probability of a hazard occurring as a result of the
attacker penetrating the system. We assume the hazard initiation success rate is the same for
a given hazard and attacker type, regardless of the penetrated state, as long as the criteria in
Table 12 have been met. The assumed hazard initiation success rates are given in Table 18.
The disgruntled employee has the greatest success rates because of his insider knowledge
of the plant. The government cyberwarrior also has high success rates because of his access
to government resources. The radical activist and terrorist have the lowest success rates of
the types, because they do not have the knowledge or resources of the other types. All of
the types have relatively high success rates because of their high skill levels.
4.5.3 Loss Transitions
Loss transitions describe the probability of a loss occurring as a result of existing hazards
and environmental conditions. Whether the attacker is able to damage the plant is dependent
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Table 18: The success rates of the attacker’s hazard initiation.







H1 0.65 0.80 0.75 0.68
H2 0.80 0.90 0.87 0.80
H3 0.67 0.80 0.75 0.65
H4 0.57 0.75 0.70 0.60
H5 0.74 0.85 0.83 0.75
H6 0.61 0.80 0.75 0.64
H7 0.58 0.75 0.71 0.61
not only on the actions selected by the players, but also on the state of the plant. To account
for the state of the plant, event tree analysis can be used [91]. Consider the example shown
in Figure 13. In this example, the initiating event is a hazard. If the defender’s corrective
action fails and a plant safety system fails, a loss will occur. Probabilities of success are
assigned to each action to determine the probability of the loss if the hazard occurs.
In this game, we assume the transition probabilities shown in Table 19. Table 19 gives
the probability that a given hazard causes a given absorbing loss. For simplicity, we assume
that each hazard can only cause one absorbing loss.
4.5.4 Recovery Transitions
Recovery transitions describe the probability of the defender expunging the attacker from
the plant to return the plant to a normal operating state. These transitions can be estimated
using expert opinion and the NIST Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery [12]. There are
two types of recovery in the SBG: penetration recovery and hazard recovery.
Penetration recovery can be initiated by the defender in any of the penetrated states.
If successful, penetration recovery results in a transition from a penetrated state to the
normal state. For simplicity, we assume a penetration recovery success rate of 0.80 for all
penetrated states. The penetration recovery action trumps any of the attacker’s offensive
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Figure 13: Event tree mapping a hazard to a loss.
actions directed towards ICS components, but the attacker’s hazard initiation trumps the
defender’s penetration recovery. Consider the following examples for clarification.
• In this example, the defender chooses penetration recovery with a success rate of 0.80 and
the radical activist chooses a wireless exploit on PLC-1A with success rate of 0.70. The
probability of transitioning to the normal state is the penetration recovery success rate,
0.80. The probability of transitioning to another penetrated state where the attacker has
penetrated PLC-1A is 0.70(1− 0.80) = 0.14. Finally, the probability of remaining in the
originating penetrated state is (1− 0.70)(1− 0.80) = 0.06.
• In this example, the defender chooses penetration recovery with a success rate of 0.80
and the radical activist chooses H1 hazard initiation with a success rate of 0.65. The
probability of transitioning to the hazard state is the hazard initiation success rate, 0.65.
The probability of transitioning to the normal state is 0.80(1−0.65) = 0.28. Finally, the
probability of remaining in the originating penetrated state is (1−0.80)(1−0.65) = 0.07.
Hazard recovery can be initiated by the defender in any of the hazard states. If successful,
hazard recovery results in a transition from a hazard state to the normal state. For simplicity,
we assume a hazard recovery success rate of 0.70 for all hazard states. The defender’s hazard
recovery action trumps the attacker’s loss initiation action. Consider the example where the
state is the H5 hazard state the defender chooses hazard recovery with a success rate of 0.70,
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Table 19: The probability of hazard states transitioning to loss states, given that the attacker
has chosen loss initiation and the defender’s hazard recovery is unsuccessful.
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
H1 — 5× 10−6 5× 10−5 — 2× 10−2 5× 10−4
H2 5× 10−2 5× 10−6 5× 10−5 4× 10−2 9× 10−1 5× 10−4
H3 — — — 4× 10−2 — 8× 10−3
H4 9× 10−1 — — 1× 10−1 — —
H5 — 1× 10−5 1× 10−4 — — 1× 10−3
H6 — 1× 10−6 1× 10−5 — — 1× 10−4
H7 2× 10−2 — — — — —
and the attacker chooses loss initiation. If the attacker successfully initiates a loss in the H5
state, the probability of transitioning to L2 is 1×10−5, the probability of transitioning to L3 is
1×10−4, and the probability of transitioning to L6 is 1×10−3. The probability of transitioning
to the normal state is the hazard recovery rate, 0.70. The probability of transitioning to
L2 is (1 − 0.70) × 10−5, the probability of transitioning to L3 is (1 − 0.70) × 10−4, and the
probability of transitioning to L6 is (1 − 0.70) × 10−3. The probability of remaining in the
hazard state is 0.2997.
4.6 Utility Functions
We now consider the utility functions of the players. The utility functions quantify the
outcomes of the game for each player, and serves as the metric of each player’s performance.
There are two types of utility functions: immediate utility functions and cumulative utility
functions. The immediate utility functions quantify the reward or penalty incurred by
each player after one time step in the SBG. The cumulative utility function aggregates
the immediate utilities to quantify performance over the entire game.
81
4.6.1 Immediate Utility Functions
The immediate utility function describes the payoff to the player after decisions have
been made in a particular state. In this work, each player’s immediate utility function has
the units of dollars. The general form of player A/D’s immediate utility function resulting
from a transition from stochastic state si to state sj after action profile aD,A = (aD, aA) and
state history sH = {s0, s1, . . . , si, sj} is
rA/D(s
H , aD,A) = −ΨA/D(si, aD/A) + ΩA/D(sH) (4.2)
The first term on the right-hand side, ΨA/D, represents the cost incurred by player A/D
for selecting his action. This term is dependent only on the originating state and the action
selected by that player. For the attacker, ΨA is the implementation cost of launching a cyber
attack against the NPP. For the defender, ΨD is the cost of cybersecurity actions for the
NPP.
The expenses for the defender’s defensive cybersecurity choices are given in Table 14 and
the expenses for the attacker’s penetrating choices are given in Table 15. The expenses for
the defender’s recovery actions are given in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. The attacker incurs no
costs to initiate hazards or losses after penetrating the system. We have assumed these values
based on the access, resources, and skill of the threat agents as defined by the TAL. These
values are assumed for demonstration purposes. In practice, additional threat intelligence
and financial data should also be used. The government resources of the government
cyberwarrior and organization resources of the radical activist and terrorist provide them
with some advantages over the disgruntled employee, but the disgruntled employee’s internal
access to the NPP can also result in some reduced expenses. We assume that there is no
expense to the attacker to abstain from a particular action. We also assume that there is no
expense to the defender to leave a device in its default configuration.
The second term on the right-hand side, ΩA/D, represents the loss or gain incurred by
player A/D as a result of the state transition. To be general, ΩA/D is dependent on s
H ,
but often it is only dependent on si and/or sj. Outcomes that could generate a gain for the
attacker and a loss for the defender include the penetration of a device, initiation of a hazard,
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Table 20: Utility ($) given to each player when a device is penetrated.







PLC-1A −2.50× 105 7.50× 106 5.00× 107 1.25× 107 2.50× 105
PLC-1B −2.50× 105 7.50× 106 5.00× 107 1.25× 107 2.50× 105
PLC-2A −2.50× 105 7.50× 106 5.00× 107 1.25× 107 2.50× 105
PLC-2B −2.50× 105 7.50× 106 5.00× 107 1.25× 107 2.50× 105
Switch −1.00× 106 3.00× 107 2.00× 108 5.00× 107 1.00× 106
Network −1.00× 106 3.00× 107 2.00× 108 5.00× 107 1.00× 106
or the initiation of a loss. Outcomes that could generate a loss for the attacker and a gain for
the defender include the prosecution of an attacker and publicity about a thwarted attack.
Note that all of these outcomes must be assigned a monetary value for unit consistency.
The rewards given to each player when each device is penetrated are given in Table 20.
These values are consistent with the L7 magnitudes given in Table 6 for the defender and
in Table 10 for the attacker. The rewards for device penetration are dependent on sH .
Each reward is only eligible to be earned once during the game. For example, if PLC-1A
is penetrated by θ1A, θ
1
A earns a reward of $7.50 × 106 and the defender incurs a penalty
of –$2.50 × 105. If the defender returns the game from a penetrated state to the normal
state, the attacker loses control of PLC-1A. If the attacker re-penetrates PLC-1A later in
the game, the attacker does not gain an additional reward from penetrating the device. This
is because the data that was on PLC has already been stolen by the attacker. The incentive
for the attacker to penetrate the PLC again is the potential to cause a hazard or loss. The
defender does incur the penalty each time a device is penetrated.
For every transition to the normal state, the defender earns a reward of $1× 108 and the
attackers do not incur a reward or penalty. For every transition to a penetrated state, the
defender earns a reward of $1 × 107 and incurs the penalties specified in Table 20. This is
because it is assumed that the plant can still operate in some capacity in these states.
The rewards earned by the attacker when the game transitions to a hazard state and the
penalties incurred by the defender are given in Table 21. The hazard rewards and penalties
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Table 21: Utility ($) given to each player when a hazard occurs.







H1 −1× 1010 5× 107 3× 109 2× 1010 5× 1010
H2 −1× 1010 5× 109 3× 109 3× 1011 5× 1010
H3 −1× 107 5× 109 3× 109 2× 1010 3× 107
H4 −2× 105 3× 108 3× 109 3× 1011 2× 108
H5 −1× 1010 5× 107 3× 109 2× 1010 5× 1010
H6 −1× 1010 5× 107 3× 109 2× 1010 5× 1010
H7 −2× 105 3× 108 3× 109 3× 1011 2× 108
were estimated to be 10% of the maximum loss reward or penalty that may result from that
hazard. These values are only dependent on the hazard, not the penetrated state that causes
the hazard, therefore these values are only a function of sj.
The rewards earned by the attacker when the game transitions to a loss state are given
in Table 10, and the penalties incurred by the defender are given in Table 6. These values
are only dependent on the loss, not the hazard that causes the loss, therefore these values
are only a function of sj.
4.6.2 Cumulative Utility Functions
The cumulative utility functions aggregate the immediate utilities earned by the players
throughout the game, and measures the performance of each player. Each player seeks to
maximize his cumulative utility. The cumulative utility function of player A/D is
uA/D(s
0, σA, σD) =
∞∑
t=0
βtA/DE[rA/D(st, atD,A, st+1)] (4.3)
The parameter σA/D denotes player A/D’s strategy — the discrete probability distribution
that is assigned to the action set of that player at each state in the stochastic game. The
cumulative utility function is also dependent on the initial state, s0. Here the initial state is
the normal state. The discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) describes players’ preferences for utility
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earned earlier in the game relative to utility earned later in the game. The superscript t on
the discount factor is an exponent, and superscript on the state and action profile variables
is a time index. The function E[·] denotes the expectation over the states and strategies.
The primary practical purpose of the discount factor is to affect the players’ action
selections. A player with a large discount factor is more willing to wait for a large payoff
than a player with a small discount factor. We do not define discount factors for the attacker
because the attacker’s decision method will be governed by a separate algorithm. For the
defender, we define a discount factor of 0.9999. This discount factor reflects the importance
of utility earned at all time steps in the game.
4.7 Decision Algorithms
The final consideration in constructing the SBG is defining the players’ decision-making
processes. Consider the flowchart of SBG simulation shown in Figure 14. At each time
step, the players make their decisions in parallel, and their decisions stochastically affect the
progression of the game. There are three processes for the defender: Bayesian learning of the
attacker’s parameters, estimation of the attacker’s type, and action selection via HBA. For
the attacker, the decision-making process consists of a single algorithm that is dependent
on the game history. This section describes the processes used by the players to select their
actions.
4.7.1 The Defender
The defender uses Bayesian learning and HBA as described in Section 3.4.1 and
Section 3.4.2, respectively. This section describes their implementation in the context of
our game.
4.7.1.1 Bayesian Learning of Attacker’s Parameters We assume that the defender

















































































































































































































Table 22: Initial loss estimates for each attacker type.
Type Lower Bound ($) Upper Bound ($) Initial Estimate ($) True Value ($)
θ1A 1.00× 105 1.00× 107 5.05× 106 2.00× 106
θ2A 1.00× 104 1.00× 106 5.05× 105 2.00× 104
θ3A 1.00× 105 1.00× 107 5.05× 106 1.00× 106
θ4A 1.00× 1010 1.00× 1012 5.05× 1011 7.00× 1011
L2 for several reasons. The first reason is that the utility of L2 is likely to depend on factors
that are not explicitly financial. For example, the attacker’s code of ethics may affect the
desirability of L2, regardless of the financial damage to the NPP or the world. The second
reason is that the value of L2 is the most significant loss to the defender. The defender’s
penalty for L2 is greater than the other loss penalties by at least three orders of magnitude.
The lower bound, upper bound, and initial estimate for each type are given in Table 22.
The initial estimate is assumed to be the average of the lower and upper bounds. We define
the initial belief density over L2 for each type to be a truncated normal distribution centered
about the initial estimate with a standard deviation equal to one half of the range of L2.
The Bayesian learning algorithm uses approximate Bayesian updating to update the
belief density over L2 for each type. In approximate Bayesian updating, belief densities
are approximated as polynomials and convolved to update beliefs. For all polynomial
approximations, we sample 50 points uniformly distributed over the belief density and fit a
fifth-degree polynomial to those points.
4.7.1.2 Estimating the Attacker’s Type The probability of each attacker type is
calculated using Equation 3.16 where the product posterior is given by Equation 3.17. The
product posteriors are calculated using the attacker’s strategy algorithm with the defender’s
estimates of the attacker’s utility of L2. To prevent the premature elimination of any types,
we ensure that the minimum probability assigned to each type at each time step is 0.01. The
product posteriors also require rescaling if values become close to machine epsilon.
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4.7.1.3 HBA Implementation Implementing the full version of HBA given by Equa-
tions 3.14 and 3.15 for this game would be highly computationally expensive. Instead, we
implement the version of HBA with path sampling given by Equations 3.18 and 3.19. The
path-sampling version of HBA has three basic steps:
1. For each defense action available in the current state, compute the cumulative utility for
n paths resulting from that action.
2. Calculate the average cumulative utility for each defense action.
3. Calculate the defense strategy as a uniform distribution over the defense actions that
have the greatest average cumulative utility.
If the paths are stochastically selected, care must be taken to select an appropriate
number of paths. If too few paths are sampled, there is a risk that the average cumulative
utility of the sampled paths may not be close to the true expected utility of the defense
action. If too many paths are sampled, the process may be too computationally expensive.
We tested HBA using various path sampling sizes to determine what sample size was
most cost-effective. We set the number of paths per action, and the paths were stochastically
generated using the state transition function, the attacker’s decision algorithm with the most
current estimates of the attacker’s parameters, and a uniform distribution over the defender’s
subsequent actions. It became clear that a large sample size was not computationally feasible
for this game. When using small sample sizes of stochastically generated paths, the decisions
made by the defender were inconsistent and often clearly suboptimal. To accommodate our
computational limitations, we instead implemented a sampling approach that was partly
deterministic and partly stochastic.
Figure 15 shows two approaches to sampling paths. Each line represents one path
stemming from a particular defense action. The direction of the line represents the utility
earned by the defender over that path, with paths angled upwards having greater utility and
paths angled downwards having lesser utility. The dashed gray line represents an “average”
path that results in the expected cumulative utility for the action in question. Now consider
a small sample of paths given by the red lines. This sample is analogous to an entirely










Figure 15: Sampling the upper and lower bounds of the paths provides a more consistent
approximation of the average path utility than performing a purely stochastic sample.
red sample. Because the sample size is small, it is likely that the average utility of the
sample will not match the true expected utility. Now consider the sample given by the blue
lines. This sample is analogous to a partially stochastic sample in the game. The dashed
blue line represents the “average” path for the blue sample. If the expected utility of an
action is close to the midpoint between the lower and upper bounds of the utility, then
intentionally sampling the lower and upper bounds may provide a better approximation of
the true expected utility than sampling a random set of paths.
Because we are constrained by computational cost, we know that we cannot generate
a sufficiently large sample with true stochastic sampling to consistently approximate the
action’s expected utility. For each action in the current state, we generate two paths.
The first path is obtained by the defender always choosing to abstain from cybersecurity
actions after taking the current action. This is expected to approximate a lower bound
on the utility resulting from the current action. This assumption is not valid for scenarios
where the attacker cannot significantly influence the defender’s utility. The second path is
obtained by the defender always choosing the most secure cybersecurity actions after taking
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the current action. This is expected to approximate an upper bound on the utility resulting
from the current action. This approximation is not valid when security costs significantly
outweigh security benefits. Within these paths, the attacker’s actions and state trajectory
are still generated stochastically. The attacker’s actions are generated stochastically using
Algorithm 2 with the defender’s beliefs about the attacker’s utility of L2.
The length of the path can also affect computation time. One option is to allow the path
to continue indefinitely until an absorbing state is reached. The less expensive option is to
limit the paths to a finite number of time steps. The path is terminated if it has not reached
an absorbing state by the time the limit has been reached. In this work, we use a maximum
path length of five time steps. This path length was selected to allow the simulated attacker
approximately two attempts to reach a loss state.
The disadvantage of using a small path length is that the defender’s long-term view of the
game is limited. As an example, consider the situation where the game is in a hazard state,
and the defender must choose between two actions: (1) attempt hazard recovery to return
the game to the normal state, or (2) abstain from action and risk the game transitioning
to a loss state. Hazard recovery has a significant cost, but the defender is able to accrue
rewards when the game is in the normal state and some penetrated states. Transitioning
from a hazard to a loss causes the defender to incur a significant penalty and terminates the
game. Because the path size is limited, the defender may not recognize the full potential of
future rewards in the normal and penetrated states. This defender does not have an accurate
incentive to recover the plant and may choose to abstain from action.
We introduce a utility adjustment factor to account for potential future rewards that
may be omitted by a small path length. The utility factor is added to the expected utility
of the path if the path is not terminated by an absorbing state and the final time step of the
path does not exceed a threshold. The utility factor is given by




The utility factor is UF θ and it is specific to the attacker type, θ, that is being faced in the
current path. The time step at the end of the path is given by tp and the expected duration
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Table 23: Parameters of the utility adjustment factor used to evaluate paths in HBA.
Type E[tθ] (time steps) E[∆u] ($)
θ1 24 3.03× 107
θ2 12 2.53× 107
θ3 14 2.61× 107
θ4 17 2.14× 107
of a game played against θ is given by E[tθ]. The utility factor is only implemented if
tp < E[tθ]. The defender’s discount factor is β and E[∆uθ] is the expected utility earned by
the defender in per time step when facing type θ.
The values of E[tθ] and E[∆uθ] were obtained from preliminary simulation data. We
simulated the attacker playing against each type 500 times. In these simulations, the attacker
followed the decision algorithm given in Section 4.7.2 and the defender always chose the
most secure action. The parameters E[tθ] were selected from the mean of the data. The
parameters E[∆uθ] were selected from the medians of the data because the results were
significantly skewed. The simulation results are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
The values of E[tθ] and E[∆uθ] are given in Table 23.
In summary, for HBA we use two paths per action in a given state, where the first path
is given by the least secure subsequent defense actions, and the second path is given by the
most secure subsequent defense actions. We limit the depth of the path to be five time steps
and add a utility adjustment factor for paths that do not reach an absorbing state.
4.7.2 The Attacker
The mechanism of the attacker’s decision-making in the normal and penetrated states
is Algorithm 2. The implementation of this decision algorithm is somewhat arbitrary. In
general, attacker types are not required to follow the same decision algorithm. It is assumed
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η 2.0 1.0 4.0 2.5
ν 1.2 2.0 1.5 0.14
that all attacker types follow this algorithm, but with different parameters. In practice,
additional types may be constructed if there are multiple credible decision algorithms for a
particular threat.
The algorithm evaluates the hazard options accessible to the attacker from the current
state, and compares them to the attacker’s most desirable hazard. If the most desirable
hazard is inaccessible, we calculate the probability that the attacker settles for the best
accessible hazard. The remaining probability is distributed over the actions that could bring
the attacker to a state from which a more desirable hazard is accessible. The probability
distribution over the attacker’s actions is then sampled to determine the attacker’s action.
The following section describes the algorithm in greater detail.
In line 1 of the algorithm, the attacker ranks the hazards by their expected utilities. The





The set of all losses is given by L. The parameter p(L|H) gives the probability of loss L
occurring as a consequence of H, assuming no defender intervention. If defender intervention
were included, all expected hazard utilities would be scaled by the same hazard recovery
failure rate, because it is assumed that hazard recovery has the same cost and success rate
for all hazards. The parameter Ωθ(L) is the utility that the attacker of type θ assigns to L.
The hazard with the greatest expected utility is denoted by H∗.
In lines 2–7 of the algorithm, the attacker identifies the best hazard that is accessible
from the current state, s0, and compares that hazard to H
∗. For further calculations, the
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Algorithm 2 The attacker’s decision algorithm for normal and penetrated states
1: Rank the hazards by their expected utilities, and identify hazard, H∗, with the greatest
expected utility (Equation 4.5)
2: if at least one hazard is accessible from the current state, s0 then
3: Identify accessible hazard, Ha, that has the greatest scaled utility, µa (Equation 4.6)
4: Calculate p(Ha) (Equation 4.10)
5: Assign p(Ha) to initiation of Ha and assign zero to initiation of all H 6= Ha
6: else
7: Set p(Ha) = 0, µa = 0
8: end if
9: for each hazard, Hi, that is currently unavailable and has utility µi > µa do
10: Calculate p(Hi) (Equation 4.11)
11: for each set of penetrated devices, Dj, that can cause Hi do
12: Identify state, s1, where Dj has been achieved (relative to s0)
13: for each action, α, in the action set do
14: if α targets a transition from s0 to s1 then
15: Calculate estimated utility ũ(α|Hi, s0, s1) (Equation 4.12)
16: else





22: for each penetrating action, α in set of all penetrating actions, A do
23: Calculate p(α) (Equation 4.15)
24: end for
25: Sample the discrete probability distribution over all actions to select the action
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utility is scaled to introduce greater sensitivity with respect to L2, the loss with uncertain




p(Li|H)Ωθ(Li) + p(L2|H)Ωθ(L2)Ω̂θ(L2)νθ (4.6)
The circumflex on Ω̂θ signifies the belief that the agent using the decision algorithm has
regarding θ’s utility parameter. For θ, Ωθ = Ω̂θ, but if the defender is using this algorithm to
make predictions about θ’s behavior, the two parameters may differ. Finally, νθ is a scaling
parameter specific to θ. Care should be taken when defining νθ to ensure that the argument
of Equation 4.9 is within the function’s domain. The values of ν for each type are given
in Table 24. The term Ω̂θ(L2)
νθ acts a scaling factor used to increase the sensitivity of the
attacker’s action selection to variations in the utility assigned to L2. The scaled utility of
H∗ is µ∗.
The best accessible hazard is denoted by Ha and its scaled utility is µa. The probability
of initiating Ha is obtained by comparing µa to µ
∗, and by considering the number of times
the game has returned to the normal state from a penetrated or hazard state. The more
times the game has returned to the normal state, the more likely the attacker is to settle for




[X tanh(Cη) + 1] (4.7)
The parameter η is the number of times the game has returned to the normal state from a
penetrated or hazard state. The hyperbolic tangent function was selected for its asymptotic
properties as the argument approaches infinity. The parameters X and C were selected such
that p(Ha) approaches one as η increases and as µa approaches µ
∗. We define X and C in















The parameter X was defined such that p(Ha) approaches one as µa approaches µ
∗.
The parameter Cθ was defined to control the rate at which p(Ha) approaches one, and is
dependent on the characteristics of the attacker type, θ. Types that are more patient have
smaller values of Cθ and types that are less patient have larger values of Cθ. The parameter
ηθ is the number of returns to the normal state for the attacker to settle to the best available
hazard with a 90% chance. The values of ηθ are given in Table 24.
Through algebraic manipulation of Equations 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9, we obtain the probability








If no hazards are accessible from s0, the parameters p(Ha) and µa are set equal to zero for
later use in the algorithm.
In lines 9–21 of the algorithm, we calculate the value of attack actions with respect
to achieving access to hazards with scaled utility greater than µa. First, we calculate the
probability of pursuing each hazard Hi with µi > µa. This probability is calculated as the






The set of all hazards with µ > µa is given by H, and the scaled utility of Hj is given by µj.
Next, the algorithm considers each method by which the hazard in question can become
accessible. For example, H1 is accessible if PLC-1B is penetrated, if PLC-2B is penetrated, or
if the switch is penetrated (Table 12). The state, s1, is identified where the set of penetrated
devices, Dj, has been achieved. The state where Dj has been achieved is identified relative
to s0. For example, suppose the game is in state 16 where PLC-1A has been penetrated
and the attacker is considering penetrating PLC-1B to cause H1. PLC-1B is the only device
penetrated in state 8, but the algorithm defines s1 as state 24, where both PLC-1A and PLC-
1B are penetrated. This is because PLC-1A has already been penetrated and the underlying
structure of the game does not offer the attacker any utility or advantage for relinquishing
control of a penetrated device.
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The attacker then evaluates the estimated utility of each attack action with respect to
causing Hi via s1. The estimated utility of action α given that the attacker is targeting Hi
via s1 is







The cost of the action is denoted by −Ψθ(s0, α) and is given in Section 4.6. The term
1
2
(SRAbstain + SRSecure) is the average success rate of the action when considering the most
secure and least secure defense actions. These success rates are discussed in greater detail
below. The weighting of the items in the average is arbitrary and for demonstration purposes.
An attacker who believes the defender is more likely to play the most secure option could
assign a greater weighting to the corresponding success rate. The attacker could also assign
weighting to additional defense actions. The summation term is the expected utility of Hi,
where Ωθ(L) is the utility earned by the attacker if loss L occurs (Section 4.6). The set of
all losses is denoted by L.
The attack action has the greatest success rate when the defender abstains from
implementing a defense action. The attack action has the lowest success rate when the
defender implements the most secure defense action. These success rates were already
been calculated when analyzing state transitions, and are described in greater detail in
Section 4.5.1. The success rates are denoted by
SRAbstain = p(s1|s0,Abstain, α, θ) (4.13)
SRSecure = p(s1|s0, Secure, α, θ) (4.14)
Lines 22–25 of the algorithm calculate the probability of each action and select the final
action. This calculation only applies to penetrating actions. The probabilities of hazard
initiation actions were previously calculated in the algorithm. The probability of selecting
penetrating action α is





s∈S ũ(α|H, s0, s)∑
A∈A
∑
s∈S ũ(A|H, s0, s)
(4.15)
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This equation comes from the probability chain rule. The first term is the probability that
a hazard is not initiated. The term p(H) is the probability that the attacker pursues H
given that a hazard has not been initiated. The fraction is the probability that the attacker
chooses α given that the attacker is pursuing H. It is the ratio of the total estimated utility
of α from all pursuit options for H, to the total estimated utility of all actions for all pursuit
options for H. This approach is similar to Equation 4.11 used to calculate p(Hi).
We have now calculated the probability of all penetration actions and all hazard initiation
actions. The last step of the algorithm is to randomly select an action using the probability
distribution over the actions.
In hazard states, we define the attacker to always select loss initiation. All loss states




This chapter contains examples of individual games played against each attacker type.
For each example, we provide the state history of the game, the utilities of the players, the
defender’s estimate of the attacker’s utility of L2, and the defender’s belief regarding the type
of the attacker. The aggregate results of the SBG are presented and discussed in Chapter 6.
5.1 Radical Activist Simulation
The state trajectory for the example game played against the radical activist (θ1A) is
shown in Figure 16. The game has a relatively long duration and cycles between normal,
penetrated, and hazard states five times. These results are consistent with the average
state occurrences shown in Figure 17. The most frequently occurring penetrated states were
states 4 and 16. In state 4, PLC-2A is penetrated, and in state 16, PLC-1A is penetrated.
Excessive removal of suppression pool inventory (state 34) was the hazard that occurred the
most frequently, and damaged public opinion (state 42) was the loss that occurred most
frequently.
The cumulative utilities of the defender and θ1A are plotted on a logarithmic scale in
Figure 18. The defender loses utility when the game enters hazard states and gains utility
during the returns to the normal state. The loss that occurs in this example costs on the
order of $105 to the defender, so the loss is not very visible on the logarithmic scale. The
attacker steadily gains utility as the game enters the hazard states and makes a significant
gain in utility when damaged public opinion occurs.
The defender’s belief about the utility assigned to L2 by θ
1
A is shown in Figure 19. The
dashed blue distribution is the original truncated normal distribution, the dashed orange
distribution is the belief at the final time step of the game, the gray distributions are beliefs
at the intermediate time steps, and the vertical dashed line is the true utility. The estimates
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Figure 16: State trajectory of the example game played against θ1A.
Figure 17: Average occurrences of each state when HBA is used against each θ1A.
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Figure 18: Players’ utilities from the example game played against θ1A.
extracted from these distributions are plotted in Figure 20. The estimate made significant
progress in the first five time steps of the game, but progress slowed because inferences could
not be made in the hazard states and the attacker repeated actions in other states.
The defender’s beliefs regarding the attacker’s type while facing θ1A are shown in
Figure 21. The beliefs initially favored θ3A, but quickly converged to the correct type.
5.2 Disgruntled Employee Simulation
The state trajectory for the example game played against the disgruntled employee (θ2A)
is shown in Figure 22. The game has a relatively short duration and cycles between normal,
penetrated, and hazard states twice. These results are consistent with the average state
occurrences in Figure 23. The most frequently occurring penetrated state was state 2.
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Figure 19: The defender’s belief distributions over the range of the attacker’s possible utilities




Figure 20: The defender’s estimate of the attacker’s utility of L2 from the example game
played against θ1A.
Figure 21: The defender’s beliefs regarding the attacker’s type from example game played
against θ1A.
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Figure 22: State trajectory of the example game played against θ2A.
In state 2, the switch is penetrated. Reactor trip (state 35) was the hazard that occurred
the most frequently and loss of power generation (state 39) was the loss that occurred most
frequently.
The cumulative utilities of the defender and θ2A are plotted on a logarithmic scale in
Figure 24. The defender loses utility when the game enters hazard states and gains utility
during the returns to the normal state. The loss that occurs in this example costs on the
order of $106 to the defender, so the loss is not very visible on the logarithmic scale. The
attacker gains utility when the game enters the hazard states and makes a significant gain
in utility when loss of power generation occurs.
The defender’s belief about the utility assigned to L2 by θ
2
A is shown in Figure 25. The
dashed blue distribution is the original truncated normal distribution, the dashed orange
distribution is the belief at the final time step of the game, the gray distributions are beliefs
at the intermediate time steps, and the vertical dashed line is the true utility. The estimates
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Figure 23: Average occurrences of each state when HBA is used against each θ2A.
Figure 24: Players’ utilities from the example game played against θ2A.
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extracted from these distributions are plotted in Figure 26. The estimate did not make
significant progress because the decisions made by θ2A in the normal and penetrated states
were not significantly sensitive to changes in the utility of L2.
The defender’s beliefs regarding the attacker’s type while facing θ2A are shown in
Figure 27. The beliefs immediately identified to the correct type.
5.3 Government Cyberwarrior Simulation
The state trajectory for the example game played against the government cyberwarrior
(θ3A) is shown in Figure 28. The game has a relatively short duration and cycles between
normal, penetrated, and hazard states twice. This game also involves escalation from state
16 where PLC-1A is penetrated to state 22 where PLC-2A and PLC-2B are also penetrated.
These results are consistent with the average state occurrences shown in Figure 29. The
most frequently occurring penetrated states were state 6 and state 24. In state 6, PLC-2A
and PLC-2B are penetrated, and in state 24, PLC-1A and PLC-2A are penetrated. Reactor
trip (state 35) was the hazard that occurred the most frequently and loss of power generation
(state 39) was the loss that occurred most frequently.
The cumulative utilities of the defender and θ3A are plotted on a logarithmic scale in
Figure 30. The interpretation of this figure is the same as that for the game played against
θ2A shown in Figure 24.
The defender’s belief about the utility assigned to L2 by θ
3
A is shown in Figure 31. The
dashed blue distribution is the original truncated normal distribution, the dashed orange
distribution is the belief at the final time step of the game, the gray distributions are beliefs
at the intermediate time steps, and the vertical dashed line is the true utility. The estimates
extracted from these distributions are plotted in Figure 32. The estimate did not make
significant progress because the decisions made by θ2A in the normal and penetrated states
were not significantly sensitive to changes in the utility of L2.
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Figure 25: The defender’s belief distributions over the range of the attacker’s possible utilities




Figure 26: The defender’s estimate of the attacker’s utility of L2 from the example game
played against θ2A.
Figure 27: The defender’s beliefs regarding the attacker’s type from example game played
against θ2A.
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Figure 28: State trajectory of the example game played against θ3A.
Figure 29: Average occurrences of each state when HBA is used against each θ3A.
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Figure 30: Players’ utilities from the example game played against θ3A.
Figure 31: The defender’s belief distributions over the range of the attacker’s possible utilities




Figure 32: The defender’s estimate of the attacker’s utility of L2 from the example game
played against θ3A.
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Figure 33: The defender’s beliefs regarding the attacker’s type from example game played
against θ3A.
The defender’s beliefs regarding the attacker’s type while facing θ3A are shown in
Figure 33. At the conclusion of the game, the beliefs assigned the greatest probability
to the correct type, but were not able to rule out θ4A.
5.4 Terrorist Simulation
The state trajectory for the example game played against the terrorist (θ4A) is shown in
Figure 28. The game has a very short duration and does not return to the normal state once
the NPP has been penetrated. As in the previous example for θ3A, this game also involves
escalation from state 16 where PLC-1A is penetrated to state 22 where PLC-2A and PLC-2B
are also penetrated. These results are consistent with the average state occurrences shown
in Figure 35. Similar to the example for θ3A, the most frequently occurring penetrated states
were state 6 and state 24. In state 6, PLC-2A and PLC-2B are penetrated, and in state 24,
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Figure 34: State trajectory of the example game played against θ4A.
PLC-1A and PLC-2A are penetrated. In comparison to the example for θ3A, other penetrated
states occur more frequently. Reactor trip (state 35) was the hazard that occurred the most
frequently and loss of power generation (state 39) was the loss that occurred most frequently.
The cumulative utilities of the defender and θ4A are plotted on a logarithmic scale in
Figure 36. The interpretation of this figure is similar to those for the games played against θ2A
and θ3A shown in Figure 24 and Figure 30, respectively. The attacker’s expenses and rewards
are particularly clear in this graph because of the direct progression from the normal state
to the loss state.
The defender’s belief about the utility assigned to L2 by θ
4
A is shown in Figure 37. The
dashed blue distribution is the original truncated normal distribution, the dashed orange
distribution is the belief at the final time step of the game, the gray distributions are beliefs
at the intermediate time steps, and the vertical dashed line is the true utility. The estimates
extracted from these distributions are plotted in Figure 38. The estimation performed well
with a final value of 97.6% of the true value.
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Figure 35: Average occurrences of each state when HBA is used against each θ4A.
Figure 36: Players’ utilities from the example game played against θ4A.
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Figure 37: The defender’s belief distributions over the range of the attacker’s possible utilities




Figure 38: The defender’s estimate of the attacker’s utility of L2 from the example game
played against θ4A.
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Figure 39: The defender’s beliefs regarding the attacker’s type from example game played
against θ4A.
The defender’s beliefs regarding the attacker’s type while facing θ4A are shown in
Figure 39. The beliefs initially favored θ1A, but corrected as the game continued. At the
conclusion of the game, the beliefs assigned the greatest probability to the correct type, but
were not able to rule out θ3A.
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6.0 Results and Discussion
This chapter describes the simulation results for the SBG constructed in Chapter 4. We
simulated the game 500 times for each attacker type. From these simulations, we generate
several security metrics and analyze the performance of the defender’s Bayesian learning
during the game.
6.1 Security Metrics
We can examine several security metrics using the SBG. The first metric is the time-to-
loss. This metric is the time for the game to progress from the normal state to an absorbing
loss state. The second metric is the availability. Availability is the percentage of time during
which the NPP can operate as intended. The third metric is the defender’s utility. This
metric is the quantification of the defender’s performance throughout the entire game. The
final metric is the attacker’s utility, which quantifies the attacker’s performance throughout
the game.
6.1.1 Mean Time-to-loss
The simulation times are plotted in Figure 40. On average, games played against θ1A
lasted at least twice as long as games played against the other types. For most types, long-
lasting games are relatively rare, but they are common for θ1A. One reason for this is because
θ1A has a lower success rate for most actions than the other types. Type θ
3
A has the highest
success rates and the shortest average simulation. Types θ2A and θ
4
A also have high success
rates for many actions, particularly θ2A for actions that benefit from insider access to the
NPP.
It is important to note that termination of the game by reaching a loss is not necessarily
suboptimal. The goal of HBA is to maximize the defender’s cumulative reward, given his
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Figure 40: SBG duration from using HBA against each attacker type.
beliefs about the attacker. The utilities assigned to the losses are critical inputs to HBA’s
decision-making. If an NPP stakeholder viewed the frequency of these losses as unacceptable,
that is a sign that there are errors in the quantification of the losses’ utilities. The utility
of a loss is often dependent on both objective factors, such as the costs of equipment and
labor, and subjective factors, such as reputation within the industry and societal obligations.
If the time-to-loss results are unacceptable, the subjective loss utility factors should be re-
examined.
6.1.2 Mean Availability
The typical condition of the plant throughout a game is given in Figure 41. The most
time is spent in the normal state when playing against θ2A, and the least amount of time is
spent in the normal state when playing against θ4A. More time is spent in the penetrated
states when playing against θ4A than when playing against the other types. When playing
against θ1A, a relatively large amount of time is spent in hazard states. The relatively small
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amount of time spent in loss states when playing against θ1A is because the average game
against θ1A is longer than against the other types, and the loss states are absorbing and can
only occur once per game.
We define availability as the capacity to operate the NPP at the expected capacity.
The NPP meets this criteria while the game is in the normal state or a penetrated state.
The greatest percentage of availability occurs when facing θ4A. The percent availability when
facing θ4A is 67.5% while the percent availability for the other types is approximately 60–62%.
6.1.3 The Defender’s Cumulative Utility
The defender’s cumulative utilities are plotted in Figure 42. The defender’s utilities are
skewed because of rare highly costly losses. The defender had the greatest median utility
when facing θ1A ($1.68× 108) and the median utility when facing all other types was on the
order of $107.
Figure 43 shows the percentage of simulations that resulted in positive utility for the
defender. Notably, although the defender’s median cumulative utility is greatest when facing
θ1A, facing θ
1
A also corresponds to the smallest percentage of simulations that end with positive
utility for the defender. HBA does not assign any special consideration to the number zero.
In other words, a change in utility from -$1 to $1 is equally as valuable as a change in utility
from -$5 to -$3 or from $3 to $5. If obtaining a positive utility is of importance to the
defender, the utility function can be transformed to model this preference.
6.1.4 The Attacker’s Cumulative Utility
The attacker’s cumulative utilities are plotted in Figure 44. The utilities are plotted in
separate histograms because comparison of utility values between players and between types
is generally improper. The utility of type θ1A had the greatest relative standard deviation.
The utilities of types θ2A and θ
3
A had smaller relative standard deviations, and the utility for
θ4A was the most consistent. It should be noted that minimizing the utility of each attacker
type is not the defender’s objective. The defender’s objective is to maximize his own utility.
119
(a) Facing θ1A. (b) Facing θ
2
A.
(c) Facing θ3A. (d) Facing θ
4
A.
Figure 41: Relative time spent in each plant condition when HBA was used against each
attacker type.
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Figure 42: The defender’s cumulative utility when HBA is used against each attacker type.
Figure 43: The percentage of simulations where the defender’s cumulative utility is positive
when HBA is used against each attacker type.
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(a) Facing θ1A. (b) Facing θ
2
A.
(c) Facing θ3A. (d) Facing θ
4
A.
Figure 44: The attacker’s cumulative utility when the defender uses HBA against each
attacker type.
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6.2 Bayesian Learning of the Attacker’s Loss Utility
As the game is played, the defender draws inferences about the utility that the attacker
assigns to loss L2. Histograms of these estimates are given in Figure 45. Estimates of L2 for
θ1A tended to progress towards the true value, but not converge. Estimates of L2 for θ
2
A and
θ3A made little progress from the initial estimate. Estimates for θ
4
A were the most accurate.
The first factor affecting the learning of L2 is the short duration of most games. For most
attacker types, the median duration of a game was less than five time steps. It is difficult to
converge to the correct value of L2 when interactions between the players are limited. This
factor had the greatest affect when playing against θ1A and θ
4
A. In these cases, the estimates
often progressed towards the true value without converging.
The second factor affecting the learning of L2 was a lack of new information as the game
was played. For example, choices made in hazard states were defined to be independent of the
loss utilities, therefore inferences cannot be made about L2 in those states. Another example
is when the game enters a state multiple times and the attacker chooses the same action each
time. No new information is obtained in those interactions. These issues arise specifically
from the attacker’s decision-making process defined in Algorithm 2. Other decision-making
processes may not encounter the same challenges. This factor affected the estimation of L2
when playing against all types.
The third factor affecting the learning of L2 is that the attacker’s decisions are sometimes
not sensitive to changes in L2. The utility of L2 can affect the attacker’s decision-making
at two points in Algorithm 2. The first point in the algorithm is when the attacker ranks
the hazards by their expected utility. The expected values of each hazard are plotted as a






A, the ranking of hazards
does not change over the range of possible utilities of L2. For θ
4
A, there are four regions
over the range of L2 that correspond to different hazard rankings. This likely contributed
to greater success in estimating L2 for θ
4
A in comparison to the other types. The second
point in the algorithm is when the attacker assigns probability to each action, with the goal
of achieving a particular hazard. If L2 is of significant utility to the attacker, the attacker




(a) Facing θ1A. (b) Facing θ
2
A.
(c) Facing θ3A. (d) Facing θ
4
A.
Figure 45: The defender’s final estimate of the attacker’s loss utility when the defender uses
HBA against each attacker type.
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significant utility relative to the other losses, but for the other types, the utility of L2 is less
significant. For this reason, the utility of L2 is less likely to influence the decision-making of
those types.
Little can be done to improve the estimation of the utility parameter in cases where the
parameter does not significantly affect the attacker’s decision-making. But, if the parameter
does not significantly affect the attacker’s decision-making, it is of little use to the defender
to attempt to estimate it. In this work, L2 was selected for all attacker types because the
occurrence of L2 was of significant importance to the defender, because the utility of L2
varied significantly between attacker types, and for the sake of consistency. For future work
it is recommended to create plots similar to those in Figure 46 for each loss to identify the
parameters that are most likely to affect each type’s decision-making.
6.3 Estimating the Attacker’s Type
As the game is played, the defender updates his beliefs about which attacker type he is
facing. Histograms of these beliefs are given in Figure 47. The true type was consistently
identified when facing θ1A and θ
2
A. When playing against θ
3
A, the true type was assigned
the greatest probability, but the probability never exceeded 0.71. The true type was most
challenging to identify when facing θ4A.
Type θ1A was most straightforward to identify because θ
1
A places significant value on L4
relative to the other attacker types. Although θ2A did not have a particularly unique valuing of
the losses, θ2A was also straightforward to identify because θ
2
A had the propensity to leverage
insider access to compromise the switch. Types θ3A and θ
4
A were not as easy to identify. This
is because types θ3A and θ
4
A have similar desired losses and similar skill levels.
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(a) Expected value of hazards for θ1A. (b) Expected value of hazards for θ
2
A.
(c) Expected value of hazards for θ3A. (d) Expected value of hazards for θ
4
A.
Figure 46: The expected value of each hazard as a function of the utility of L2. The hazard
preferences of θ4A change as a function of L2.
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(a) Facing θ1A. (b) Facing θ
2
A.
(c) Facing θ3A. (d) Facing θ
4
A.
Figure 47: The defender’s final estimate of the probability of the attacker’s true type when
the defender uses HBA against each attacker type.
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7.0 Conclusions and Future Work
The goal of this research is to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks on NPPs. This
goal is achieved through the following research objectives:
1. Predict how an adversary might target a nuclear power plant
2. Quantify nuclear power plant security
3. Optimally allocate security resources to defend a nuclear power plant
The first objective was met through the work in Chapter 4 and the real-time learning
components of HBA. In Chapter 4, several approaches were presented to construct an
SBG. The approaches included modeling attack progressions through the NPP as stochastic
elements of the SBG and modeling threats to NPP as Bayesian elements of the SBG. These
approaches can also be used to construct stochastic games and Bayesian games separately.
The real-time learning components of HBA were used to estimate one of the attacker’s
utility parameters and to identify the attacker’s true type. These efforts had mixed success
for reasons discussed in Chapter 6. The limitations of these learning approaches are also
discussed in Section 7.2 below.
The second objective was met through the simulation of the SBG discussed in Chapter 6.
The first security metric is the mean time-to-loss. The time-to-loss is the time that elapses
from the beginning of the game in the normal state to the termination of the game in
a loss state. The second security metric is the mean availability. The availability is the
percentage of time during which the NPP can operate as intended. The third security
metric is the defender’s cumulative utility. The defender’s cumulative utility is a number that
quantifies the defender’s performance throughout the game. The utility is a combination of
objective economic factors and subjective factors such as societal obligations. The attacker’s
cumulative utility can also be considered a security metric, but if the attacker’s utility is of
importance to the defender, that should be included in the construction of the defender’s
utility function.
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The third objective was met through the implementation of HBA. The purpose of HBA is
to maximize the defender’s cumulative utility given the defender’s beliefs about the attacker.
Unlike the static predictive approach of many other game-theoretic methods, HBA leverages
the defender’s knowledge to make decisions in real-time. As the game is played, the defender
can draw inferences about the attacker and incorporate the most current beliefs into HBA
to optimize security decisions.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
The main contributions of this work to the fields of game theory and NPP cybersecurity
are:
1. an approach to characterize threats to NPPs and model them as attacker types in a
Bayesian game
2. an approach to construct the state space of a stochastic security game
3. an approach to define the transition function of a stochastic security game
4. a novel application of stochastic Bayesian games to cybersecurity challenges
5. methods to approximate Harsanyi-Bellman ad hoc coordination solution methods for
stochastic Bayesian games with large action spaces
7.2 Limitations
The first limitation of this research is that this approach can be computationally
expensive. The most significant cost arises from a large action space for the players,
particularly for the defender. At each time step, each defender action must be analyzed
by HBA to identify the optimal security action. This involves sampling paths resulting from
each action to estimate the defender’s utility resulting from that action. Care should be
taken to limit the number of decisions to be made by the defender and to sample action
paths in an efficient manner.
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The second limitation of this research is that the Bayesian learning efforts are dependent
on the defender’s ability to define potential decision-making processes for the attacker types.
If the defender cannot define the attacker’s decision-making method, it is possible that HBA
could learn incorrect parameters and types, and perform poorly.
The third limitation of this research is that learning of the attacker’s parameters and
type may not be feasible for some situations. These situations are:
1. When the interactions between the attacker and defender are of a short duration. Short
games limit the amount of information that can be gathered by the defender, and
therefore limit the inferences that can be drawn from that information.
2. When the attacker’s decision-making is not sensitive to the game-theoretic parameters
of interest. If the attacker’s decisions are not significantly affected by the parameter,
the defender will be unable to draw inferences about the parameter from the attacker’s
actions. If this is the case, the inference of this parameter is not important for the
defender’s decision-making process. But, if estimating the parameter is important for
other reasons such as intelligence gathering, other methods would need to be pursued.
3. When a subset of the attacker types behave similarly. If multiple types select similar
actions when exposed to the same situation, it will be challenging for the defender to
distinguish them. If this is the case, the distinction between the types may not be of
significance for that application. In fact, it may be beneficial to consolidate those types
to reduce computational costs. But, if identifying the true attacker type is important for
other reasons such as intelligence gathering, other methods would need to be pursued.
7.3 Future Work
The SBG model could be improved with future work regarding cybersecurity modeling.
For example, the SBG in this work models a device as being either penetrated or normal.
In reality, the condition of the device is not binary. An attacker could gain a variety of
privileges when compromising an ICS device, and modeling those privileges within the state
space of an SBG could provide greater insight.
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Future work could also improve the SBG model by including more sophisticated economic
modeling of the attacker’s and defender’s expenses. For example, in this work all actions
were assigned a specific cost regardless of the state or game history. In reality, the costs
for security actions may vary over time or be dependent on previous actions. For example,
some actions may have larger initial costs and low maintenance costs, while other actions
may have the opposite.
Future work related to the implementation of HBA could address computational
efficiency. For example, more sophisticated path sampling algorithms could be applied to
ensure an appropriate sample without significant additional costs. If this is accomplished,
larger decision spaces could be analyzed that are closer to the complex cybersecurity
challenges faced in industry.
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Appendix A
Observability Attacks and Game Theory
A game-theoretic approach is presented to analyze observability attacks. The attacker’s
strategy set includes all possible combinations of masked measurements. The defender’s
strategy set includes all possible combinations of measurement reinforcements. The
attacker’s and defender’s utilities are quantified using the responses of the observable and
unobservable states. The observability attack game is analyzed for a nuclear balance of
plant system. Multiple pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are identified, and
the conditions for their existence are presented. Using this procedure, a security and control
engineer can select the optimal strategy to defend a cyber-physical system from observability
attacks. The development of this problem and its solution are published in [59, 55, 57].
A.1 Attacker Controllability and Observability
The system under attack, G, is described by the linear system,
G :




where x ∈ Rn is the state variable, u ∈ Rq is the input to which the attacker has access, and
y ∈ Rp is the measured output. The matrix A ∈ Rn×n is the dynamics matrix. The matrix
B ∈ Rn×q is the input matrix, and C ∈ Rp×n is the output matrix; these matrices describe
how inputs enter the system and how measurements relate to the internal state variables. It
should be noted that a system representation is not unique. While many systems are
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nonlinear, most systems may be linearized about an operating point. This is particularly
true for nuclear power systems that often operate continuously at steady-state conditions.
For more information regarding linear systems, readers are encouraged to refer to [17].
When analyzing cyber-attack scenarios, we must consider two factors: the attacker’s
ability to affect the state of the system, and the attacker’s ability to mask the state of the
system. The system theory concepts of controllability and observability enable us to address
these considerations.
We assume that the nominal system, the one unaffected by the attacker, is both
controllable and observable. That is, if an attacker has access to the inputs of a controllable
system, the system can be driven to any state. All states of the nominal, observable system
can be reconstructed by a defender.
A system is controllable if it is possible to find some input, u, that can steer the state,
x, to any desired value in finite time. Testing for controllability is straightforward [17]:
Test 1 (Controllability). A linear system with representation given in Eq. ( A.1) is
controllable if and only if the matrix
C =
[
B AB A2B · · · An−1B
]
(A.2)
is full row rank.
Similarly, a system is observable if the state, x, can be determined from the observation
of y in finite time. The test for observability is similar to that for controllability:
Test 2 (Observability). A linear system with representation given in Eq. ( A.1) is observable
if and only if the matrix
O =
[
C ′ (CA)′ (CA2)′ · · · (CAn−1)′
]′
(A.3)
is full column rank.
The tests for controllability and observability both depend on the rank of a matrix. Rank
is defined as the number of linearly independent rows (columns) in a matrix. We require a
more practical test for situations when numerical issues must be considered. A more practical
test for rank compares the singular values of the matrix to some positive tolerance [32].
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Test 3 (Matrix Rank). The rank, r, of a matrix, X, can be determined from the singular
values, σi, of X according to the inequalities
σ1 ≥ · · · ≥ σr > ∆ ≥ σr+1 ≥ · · · ≥ σn (A.4)
A matrix is full row rank if r is equal to the number of rows in the matrix.
The tolerance, ∆, is defined to be consistent with the precision of the problem, ε. The
problem precision is dependent on the precision of the data in matrix X. If the data in
X has infinite precision, then ε is equal to the machine precision — the smallest difference
between two numbers that a computer can recognize. If the data in matrix X has finite
precision (e.g. it is obtained experimentally), then ε is equal to the precision of the data.
For a matrix X, the tolerance ∆ is defined by
∆ = ε ‖X‖∞ (A.5)





The primary advantage of this rank test is that singular values are easy to compute and
many singular value decomposition algorithms exist.
The masking of measurements by an attacker results in the elimination of rows from
C, thereby affecting the rank of the observability matrix in Test 2. It is possible that
without these measurements, a portion of the state space would be made unobservable
by the attacker; that is, even with knowledge of the system, a portion of the system state
cannot be reconstructed or estimated. An intelligent attacker could mask a particular subset
of system measurements, and then directly target those states that are unobservable.
Examining the structure of the state space provides insight to how the states are related
to the measurements and therefore how an attacker might mask an attack. A Kalman
decomposition is a transformation of the system that partitions the states according to
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their controllability and observability. There exists a transformation, T , that transforms the












The details of how to construct this transformation can be found in [14]. In this
representation, the state space has been partitioned into the unobservable states x1 ∈ Rn1
and the observable states x2 ∈ Rn2 . It is clear that the unobservable states are not seen
in the measurement y. Because of the structure of the dynamics matrix, the unobservable
states do not affect the observable states, and remain hidden even when the system model
is known.
A.2 Stealthy Observability Attacks
When a system is observable, internal state variables can be estimated by a state
observer using a system model, control inputs, and system measurements. By masking
system measurements, an attacker may cause part of the state space to become unobservable.
Unobservable states cannot be reconstructed by state observers or operators. An intelligent
attacker can mask specific measurements to cause certain states of interest to become
unobservable — this is called an observability attack [59].
Given that an attacker has managed to render a portion of the state space unobservable,
we must now consider how the attacker can affect those states. We will consider a specific
type of input, an impulse excitation with the vector input,
u(t) = vδ(t), (A.8)
where the vector v ∈ Rq is a vector amplitude of the impulse; the impulse is modeled by
the Dirac delta function. Such an input is attractive because it is transient and short-lived;
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thus, it might be missed by operators. For a unit impulse excitation
δ(t) = lim
τ→0
1/τ 0 < t < τ0 otherwise (A.9)
This is appropriate for excitations that pulse the system, but the pulse lasts for a duration,
τ , much less than the system’s characteristic time constant, Tc: τ  Tc. For multi-input
systems, both the magnitudes and signs of each element of the vector input, v, are important.
In the case of a power plant, these impulses could be the large magnitude short-duration
pulses of a valve, pump, or switch.
The attacker’s objective is to choose v to maximize the response of the unobservable
states, x1, while minimizing the response of the observable states, x2. By achieving this
objective, the attacker can maximize the damage to the unobservable portion of the plant
while remaining undetected.
The magnitudes of the unobservable and observable responses to the impulse are
Unobservable ‖x∗1‖
2 = v′(B′Q1B)v (A.10)
Observable ‖x∗2‖
2 = v′(B′Q2B)v (A.11)
where Q1 and Q2 are solutions to the Lyapunov equations
A′Qi +QiA+ C
′
iCi = 0, i = 1, 2 (A.12)
for the unobservable and observable subsystems respectively.
Once the attacker has rendered a portion of the state space unobservable, the attacker
can modify control inputs to drive those states to undesirable values.
‖x1‖ > limit ⇒ damage. (A.13)
To avoid detection, the attacker must also limit the effect of the modified control inputs on
the states that remain observable.
‖x2‖ < threshold ⇒ undetectable. (A.14)
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If the attack limits the response of the observable states while controlling the unobservable
states, it is said to be stealthy.
The stealth of an attack can be quantified using a metric called the stealth ratio.
This ratio compares the magnitude of the unobservable response to that of the observable





An attack is considered stealthy if SR 1.
An attempted observability attack can be described using three stealth categories:
1. Observable: The entire state-space remains observable and the entirety of the attack can
be seen.
2. Unstealthy: A portion of the state-space has been rendered unobservable, but the
response of the unobservable states is small relative to the response of the observable
states.
3. Stealthy: A portion of the state-space has been rendered unobservable, and the response
of the unobservable states is large relative to the response of the observable states.
An observability attack can be analyzed using game theory, where the attacker and defender’s
utilities are functions of the attack stealth.
A.3 Game-Theoretic Approach
Using game theory, we will analyze the observability attack and select an effective defense.
There are three components to a game:
1. Players: These are the individuals or entities participating in the game. The observability
attack will be formulated as a two-player simultaneous game. The two players are an
attacker targeting the plant and a defender protecting the plant. All parameters pertinent
to the attacker will be denoted with a subscript, A, and all parameters pertinent to the
defender will be denoted with a subscript, D.
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2. Strategies: These are the actions taken by the players in the game.
a. Pure Strategy: The ith strategy of the defender is denoted siD. The entire set of
strategies available to the defender is denoted SD = {siD|i = 1 . . . N}. The attacker’s
strategies, siA, and strategy set, SA, are similarly defined.
b. Mixed Strategy: A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over a player’s pure
strategy set. Let σD denote a mixed strategy of the defender. Let σD(sD) denote
the probability of the defender playing pure strategy sD. The support of σD is the
set of pure strategies to which σD assigns a positive probability. Let σA and σA(sA)
be similarly defined for the attacker. There are an infinite number of possible mixed
strategy profiles.
3. Utilities: These are the payoffs to the players that result from the strategy profile of the
game. In other words, each player’s utility is dependent on both the strategy that they
employ and the strategy of their opponent. The defender’s utility for playing strategy












A matrix of both players’ strategies and their resulting utilities is constructed to analyze
the game; see table 25. Each row in the utility matrix corresponds to one of the defender’s
strategies, siD, and each column corresponds to one of the attacker’s strategies, s
j
A. Each
entry in the matrix shows the defender’s utility, πijD, and the attacker’s utility, π
ij
A . Using
these quantified utilities, we can evaluate the observability attack game to determine which
defense strategy is likely to yield the greatest benefit.
It should be noted that these utility parameters could be a function of risk metrics
determined by another formal risk analysis. The pairing of these game-theoretic techniques
and traditional risk assessment methodologies such as probabilistic risk assessment may
provide greater insight for complex systems. This is particularly appropriate for nuclear
power systems, which have a long history of using probabilistic risk assessment tools to
evaluate the safety of plants [80].
Using the process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, we can eliminate
strategies that no rational player would select. One of the defender’s strategies, siD, is
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Table 25: An example of the observability attack game. The utilities for the attacker and








































A · · · πNMD , πNMA
said to be dominated by another strategy, sjD, if s
j
D yields the defender a utility at least as
great as that yielded by siD for each of the attacker’s strategies. That is, s
i






A) ≥ πD(siD, skA) ∀skA ∈ SA (A.16)
A dominated strategy can be eliminated from the game because no rational player would
select it. In the process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, all dominated
strategies are eliminated for one player, then for the next player. After the first round
of elimination, there may be strategies that were not dominated in the first round, but are
dominated in the reduced form of the game. These strategies can be removed from the game
in a second round of elimination. Iterated elimination of dominated strategies continues
until none of the players have any dominated strategies.
An effective defense strategy can be selected using the concepts of a best response and
a Nash equilibrium. A player’s best response to an opponent’s strategy is the strategy that
will yield the greatest utility for that player [22]. A defense strategy skD is the defender’s











D ∈ SD (A.17)
The attacker’s best response is similarly defined.
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A Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy profile such that each player’s strategy is an
optimal response to the other player’s strategy. At a Nash equilibrium, neither player has
an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy if the other player’s strategy remains
unchanged. Nash equilibria may include pure and/or mixed strategies. In a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium, a unilateral deviation to any of the pure strategies in the support of a
given player’s mixed strategy will yield that player an expected utility equal to the expected
utility of playing the mixed strategy [29]. Let a player’s mixed strategy at a Nash equilibrium










A) ≥ πA(σ∗D, sA) ∀sA ∈ SA (A.19)
Note that if the attacker’s and/or the defender’s strategy at the Nash equilibrium is pure,
σ∗A and/or σ
∗




D as necessary. The













Having discussed the foundational elements of game theory, we will now introduce the
application of game theory to observability attacks.
A.3.1 Game Overview
In this observability attack game, the defender will attempt to protect the system while
the attacker attempts an observability attack. The attacker will choose strategies that
mask certain measurements from the defender, thus altering the system’s observability. The
defender will choose strategies that reinforce certain measurements, thereby thwarting the
attacker. The attacker’s and defender’s utilities both depend in part upon the resulting
stealthiness of the plant for the selected pair of strategies. The structure of this game is
similar to that used in [55, 56].
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A.3.2 The Defender
The set of the defender’s strategies includes reinforcing all possible combinations of
measurements in the system. Examples of reinforcement include the installation of redundant
sensors on a separate network or implementing trusted patches. It is assumed that if the
defender has reinforced a sensor that the attacker has targeted, then the attack on that
sensor is unsuccessful. It is assumed that the attacker has gained access to all control
inputs, therefore the option of defending actuators is not included in the defender’s strategy
set.
The defender’s utilities, πijD, are calculated as a function of the attack stealth and the






The attack stealth contributes to the defender’s utility through the term LijD. This term
is dependent on both the strategy of the defender and that of the attacker, and there are
three cases depending upon whether the attack is observable, unobservable but unstealthy,
or unobservable but stealthy:
1. If the set of successfully masked measurements does not alter the results of the
observability test, the attack is observable and the defender incurs a loss of LOD.
2. If the stealth ratio is small, the attack is unstealthy and the defender incurs a loss of LUD.
3. If the stealth ratio is sufficiently large, the attack is stealthy and the defender incurs a
loss of LSD.




D. For ease of demonstration, we have assumed that the
defender’s utility is dependent on attack stealth and not on which portion of the state space
has been stealthily attacked.
In this paper, we assume that the cost of defense is proportional to the number of
reinforced measurements. This assumption is applicable to a large class of problems. The
fixed cost of defense increases for a greater number of sensors, and variable cost increases
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due to greater operation and maintenance costs. In general, while a cost curve may not in
fact be linear, this linear assumption is sufficient for this paper and it provides first-order
insight to the problem.
The total cost of defending the system is represented by EiD. The cost of defending
the system is computed as the product of the number of reinforced measurements, niD,
for defense strategy siD, and the cost of reinforcing a measurement, CD. We assume that
CD > 0. It is assumed that the cost of reinforcing each measurement is identical and that
each measurement must be reinforced individually.
A.3.3 The Attacker
The set of the attacker’s strategies includes masking all possible combinations of
measurements in the system. Some combinations may be more feasible than others due
to the number of masked measurements required to launch a stealthy attack. It is assumed
that the attacker has gained access to all system control inputs and can access all of them
for each strategy.
The attacker’s utilities, πijA , are calculated as a function of the attack stealth and the






The attack stealth contributes to the attacker’s utility through the term GijA. This term
is dependent on both the strategy of the attacker and that of the defender, and there are
three cases depending upon whether the attack is observable, unobservable but unstealthy,
or unobservable but stealthy:
1. If the set of successfully masked measurements does not alter the results of the
observability test, the attack is observable and the attacker receives a gain of GOA.
2. If the stealth ratio is small, the attack is unstealthy and the attacker receives a gain of
GUA.
3. If the stealth ratio is sufficiently large, the attack is stealthy and the attacker receives a
gain of GSA.
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A. For ease of demonstration, we have assumed that the
attacker’s utility is dependent on attack stealth and not on which portion of the state space
has been stealthily attacked.
In this paper, we will assume that the cost of attack is proportional to the number of
masked measurements. The reasoning for this assumption is similar to that for the defender’s
cost assumptions. The total cost of attacking the system is represented by EjA. The cost of
attacking the system is computed as the product of the number of masked measurements,
njA, for attack strategy s
j
A, and the cost of masking a measurement, CA. We assume that
CA > 0. It is assumed that the cost of masking each measurement is identical and that
each measurement must be masked individually. It is assumed that the attacker has gained
access to all control inputs for all strategies, therefore the cost of hijacking actuators is not
included in the calculation of the attacker’s utility.
A.4 Balance of Plant Model
We demonstrate an observability attack on the balance of plant (BOP) of a pressurized
water reactor (PWR). The purpose of the BOP is to deliver the energy generated by the
primary system in a usable form to a turbine-generator. In a pressurized water reactor plant,
the BOP extracts thermal energy from the primary reactor loop, and converts that thermal
energy to electricity. The BOP contains the following coupled components: U-tube steam
generator, steam turbine, condenser, and pump. The steam generator is a heat exchanger
used to extract thermal energy from the primary loop. The steam is then passed to a turbine
that drives a generator to produce electricity. The output of the turbine is then condensed
to a liquid state and pumped back to the steam generator. A schematic of the system is




1 mm Narrow-range level reference
2 kg/s Steam flow rate
3 kg/s Additive flow rate from turbine reheat cycle
System Outputs
# Unit Description
1 mm Narrow-range level measurement
2 mm Wide-range level measurement
3 MPa High-pressure turbine first-stage pressure drop
4 N m Turbine torque
Figure 48: The balance of plant system with global system inputs and measurements
identified.
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A.4.1 U-Tube Steam Generator
The U-tube steam generator model developed by [47] has been implemented in this work.
The optimal algebraic controller designed by [1] has been used to stabilize and control the
steam generator. The controller tracks a narrow-range water level reference input.
Two control inputs are associated with the steam generator system: the narrow-range
reference level, u1, and the steam flow rate exiting the steam generator, u2. The actuator of
the narrow-range water level is the feedwater control valve, and the actuator of the steam
flow rate is the turbine control valve.
Two measurements are associated with the steam generator system: the narrow-range
water level, y1, and the wide-range water level, y2. The narrow-range water level is based on
the pressure differential between two points near the water level. The wide-range water level
is based on the pressure differential between the top and bottom of the steam generator.
While the narrow-range water level reflects the steam/water mixture level, the wide-range
water level reflects the mass of water in the steam generator [49].
A.4.2 Steam Turbine
A generalized model of a steam turbine with high, medium, and low pressure sections
was developed by [50]. That model has been modified in this work to include one high-
pressure turbine and three low-pressure turbines to be consistent with common PWR turbine
configurations. After passing through the high-pressure turbine, the steam goes through a
reheat cycle and then passes through the three low-pressure turbines.
Two control inputs are associated with the turbine system: the steam flow rate entering
the turbine, u2, and the additive steam flow rate from the turbine reheat cycle, u3. As
previously mentioned, the actuator of the steam flow rate is the turbine control valve. The
actuator of the additive steam flow rate from the reheat cycle is the reheat control valve.
Two measurements are associated with the turbine system: the pressure drop across the
first stage of the high-pressure turbine, y3, and the total torque produced by the turbine
system, y4. The pressure drop across the first stage of the high-pressure turbine is related
to the total power produced.
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A.4.3 Condenser
The condenser is implemented to change the phase of the turbine outlet from high quality
steam to saturated liquid. This saturated liquid is then pumped to the steam generator as
feedwater. The condenser dynamics are assumed to be sufficiently rapid to be omitted from
the system model. The condenser is assumed to operate at nominal conditions. No inputs
or measurements are included for the condenser system.
A.5 Results and Discussion
A game-theoretic approach has been applied to examine the observability attack scenario.
Each pure strategy is defined in table 26. The observability outcome for each pure strategy
profile is given in table 27. We first use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to
eliminate strategies that would never be played by a rational individual. Next, we identify
the pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the game, and present the conditions
for their existence. Finally, we demonstrate the analysis for a numerical example.
A.5.1 Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies
Using iterative elimination of dominated strategies, we will reduce the dimension of the
observability attack game. First, let us examine the attacker’s strategies. We will begin
by comparing the attack strategies that incur the same cost (i.e. have the same number of
masked sensors, nA), and then compare the remaining strategies. We take this approach
because the cost of conducting the attack is the same for strategies that have the same nA,
and we can easily determine if a strategy is dominated by referring to table 27 for the attack
stealth.
First let us examine strategies with nA = 1. It is seen that s
2
A is dominated by s
1
A
because s1A does at least as well as s
2
A against each of the defender’s strategies. For eight
of the defender’s strategies, the outcome is observable when the attacker plays either s1A or






Table 26: The strategies of the attacker and defender. The defender’s strategy siD includes a
set of reinforced signals of quantity nD. The attacker’s strategy s
j
A includes a set of masked




s3 2 1 2
s4 1 3
s5 2 1 3
s6 2 2 3
s7 3 1 2 3
s8 1 4
Strategy n Signals
s9 2 1 4
s10 2 2 4
s11 3 1 2 4
s12 2 3 4
s13 3 1 3 4
s14 3 2 3 4
s15 4 1 2 3 4
s16 0
results in an unstealthy attack while s1A results in an observable attack. By similar reasoning,
s4A and s
8
A are also dominated by s
1






A , and s
12
A are
dominated by s3A. We note that at this stage of iterative elimination, s
3
A does not dominate
s9A, and s
9
A does not dominate s
3
A, therefore neither will be eliminated. For nA = 3, we can
see that s7A, s
13
A , and s
14
A are dominated by s
11
A . The only domination that occurs between
strategies of varying nA is that s
15
A is dominated by s
11
A . The dominated strategy has a greater
cost of attack than the dominating strategy, and results in stealth gains less than or equal







A , and s
16
A . The columns corresponding to all dominated attacker strategies
can be eliminated from the game matrix.
We will now examine the defender’s strategies using the same methodology as was
used for the attacker’s strategies. It is important to note that the dominated attacker
strategies have been removed from the game matrix, therefore we will only consider the
game outcomes corresponding to the intersection of the remaining attacker strategies and
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Table 27: Stealth outcomes of the observability attack game: (O) observable attack; (U)
































s1D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
s2D U O U O U O U O S O S O U O U O
s3D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
s4D U O S O U O S O S O S O S O S O
s5D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
s6D U O U O U O U O S O S O S O S O
s7D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
s8D U O S O U O S O U O S O U O S O
s9D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
s10D U O U O U O U O U O U O U O U O
s11D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
s12D U O S O U O S O U O S O U O S O
s13D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
s14D U O U O U O U O U O U O U O U O
s15D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
s16D U O S O U O S O S O S O U O S O
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Table 28: Normal form of the reduced observability attack game. The defender’s utility is









−LOD − CD −LOD − CD −LOD − CD −LOD − CD
GOA − CA GOA − 2CA GOA − 2CA GOA
s16D
−LUD −LSD −LSD −LOD
GUA − CA GSA − 2CA GSA − 2CA GOA






D are dominated by s
1
D.




D , and s
12
D are dominated by s
3
D. For nD = 3, we can see
that s14D is dominated by s
7













D , and s
15
D all have the same stealth outcomes for each attack strategy.
The strategy s1D dominates the other strategies because it has the lowest value of nD and
therefore incurs the lowest cost to the defender. Thus, the remaining undominated defender
strategies are s1D and s
16
D . The rows corresponding to all dominated defender strategies can
be eliminated from the game matrix.
Iterated elimination of dominated strategies continues until no strategy can be elimi-





outcomes equal to s9A, but also a greater nA. No additional defender strategies are domi-
nated. The reduced normal form of the observability game is given in table 28. The existence
of pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria will now be examined.
A.5.2 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria
There are four potential pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the observability attack game.
The existence of each equilibrium is dependent on the relative magnitudes of the attacker’s
and defender’s utility parameters. To verify that a pure-strategy profile is indeed a Nash
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equilibrium, it is sufficient to check that unilateral deviations by each player to another
pure strategy does not result in a greater utility for that player. Each pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium is discussed below.
A.5.2.1 No reinforcement or masking The pure strategy profile (s16D , s
16
A ) is a Nash
equilibrium of the observability game if two conditions are satisfied.
1. CA > G
U
A −GOA
The first condition is that the cost of attacking must outweigh the benefit of achieving
an unstealthy attack rather than an observable attack. This condition is obtained by





The second condition is that the cost of attacking must outweigh the benefit of achieving a
stealthy attack rather than an observable attack. This condition is obtained by examining
the attacker’s pure strategy deviation to s3A or s
9
A.
It is already noted that s16D is the defender’s best response to s
16
A ; therefore no additional
conditions regarding the defender’s utility parameters are necessary.
A.5.2.2 No reinforcement and one masking The pure strategy profile (s16D , s
1
A) is a
Nash equilibrium of the observability game if three conditions are satisfied.
1. CD > L
U
D − LOD
The first condition is that the cost of defense must outweigh the loss of an unstealthy
attack rather than an observable attack. This condition is obtained by examining the
defender’s pure strategy deviation to s1D.
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2. CA < G
U
A −GOA
The second condition is that the benefit of achieving an unstealthy attack rather than
an observable attack must outweigh the cost of attacking. This condition is obtained by
examining the attacker’s pure strategy deviation to s16A .
3. CA > G
S
A −GUA
The third condition is that the cost of attacking must outweigh the benefit of achieving a
stealthy attack rather than an unstealthy attack. This condition is obtained by examining
the attacker’s pure strategy deviation to s3A or s
9
A.
A.5.2.3 No reinforcement and two maskings The pure strategy profiles (s16D , s
3
A)
and (s16D , s
9
A) are Nash equilibria of the observability game if three conditions are satisfied.
1. CD > L
S
D − LOD
The first condition is that the cost of defense must outweigh the loss of an stealthy attack
rather than an observable attack. This condition is obtained by examining the defender’s
pure strategy deviation to s1D.
2. CA < G
S
A −GUA
The second condition is that the benefit of achieving an stealthy attack rather than an
unstealthy attack must outweigh the cost of attacking. This condition is obtained by





The third condition is that the benefit of achieving a stealthy attack rather than an
observable attack must outweigh the cost of attacking. This condition is obtained by
examining the attacker’s pure strategy deviation to s16A .
A.5.2.4 Impossible pure-strategy equilibria Some pure-strategy profiles cannot
result in Nash equilibria. These results are evident from the best responses that were
previously identified. The strategy profile (s1D, s
16
A ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium because the
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A) cannot be Nash equilibria because the attacker increases his
utility from GOA − CA or GOA − 2CA to GOA by deviating to s16A .
A.5.3 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
There are five support combinations that define the game’s potential mixed-strategy
Nash equilibria. The existence of each equilibrium is dependent on the the magnitudes of
the attacker’s and defender’s utility parameters. All conditions are obtained by restricting
the probability of playing a support strategy to be greater than or equal to zero and less
than or equal to one. In all cases, the support of the defender’s mixed strategy is the set of
the two strategies s1D and s
16
D . Each mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is discussed below.
A.5.3.1 One masking and two maskings In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the
attacker’s support is the set of two strategies: masking one measurement and masking two
measurements. There are two potential supports for the attacker’s strategy because there
are identical results if the attacker plays s3A or s
9














































The existence of these two equilibria is dependent on two conditions:
1. CD < L
S
D − LUD
The first condition is that the loss of a stealthy attack rather than an unstealthy attack
must outweigh the cost of defense.
2. CA < G
S
A −GUA
The second condition is that the benefit of achieving a stealthy attack rather than an
unstealthy attack must outweigh the cost of attacking.
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A.5.3.2 Zero maskings and one masking In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the
attacker’s support is the set of two strategies: abstaining from masking and masking one

































The existence of this equilibrium is dependent on two conditions:
1. CD < L
U
D − LOD
The first condition is that the loss of an unstealthy attack rather than an observable
attack must outweigh the cost of defense.
2. CA < G
U
A −GOA
The second condition is that the benefit of achieving an unstealthy attack rather than
an observable attack must outweigh the cost of attacking.
A.5.3.3 Zero masking and two maskings In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the
attacker’s support is the set of two strategies: abstaining from masking and masking two
measurements. There are two potential supports for the attacker’s strategy because there
are identical results if the attacker plays s3A or s
9















































The existence of these equilibria is dependent on two conditions:
1. CD < L
S
D − LOD
The first condition is that the loss of a stealthy attack rather than an observable attack





The second condition is that the benefit of achieving a stealthy attack rather than an
observable attack must outweigh the cost of attacking.
A.6 Summary and Conclusions
Cyber-physical systems are dependent on the integration of computational resources with
physical processes. While modern instrumentation and control systems allow for advanced
methods of monitoring and controlling systems, they also introduce new vulnerabilities.
Because the cyber and physical worlds are connected, vulnerabilities in cyberspace can have
consequences in the physical world.
Observers provide one technique to reconstruct signals masked by an attacker; however, if
the system is unobservable, the attacker may be able to steer some states to undesirable levels
while avoiding detection. To avoid detection, the attacker would design an attack input to
cause damage to the unobservable states while minimizing damage to the observable states.
This is called an observability attack.
A game-theoretic approach was presented to identify optimal strategies to defend against
observability attacks. An attacker incurred a cost to mask a measurement in the system and
received a benefit that was dependent on the stealth of the resulting attack. A defender
incurred a cost to reinforce a measurement and suffered a loss that was dependent on the
stealth of the resulting attack. For a nuclear balance of plant system, pure-strategy and
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria were identified and the conditions for their existence were
presented.
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This technique can be used to analyze cyber-physical systems during the design process
and to prioritize security upgrades for systems in operation. This technique is appropriate
when the relative magnitudes of the attacker’s and defender’s utility parameters can be
estimated. It is noteworthy that exact values of both player’s utility parameters are not
required to determine which Nash equilibria exist. By determining which Nash equilibria
exist and estimating each player’s utility parameters, security and control engineers can




In a Bayesian game, some players have incomplete information about the other players.
Within the context of critical infrastructure cybersecurity, plant defenders have incomplete
information about threat agents, and threat agents have incomplete information about plant
defenders. A Bayesian game provides a quantitative method for security teams to identify
optimal defense strategies.
The Bayesian game-theoretic approach is demonstrated on the residual heat removal
system of a boiling water reactor. Threat agents are modelled as types in the game using
a threat agent library that defines each threat’s characteristics. Similarly, different types
of defenders are modelled by considering consequences of importance to plant stakeholders.
Using these type definitions, utility functions are defined for each player. Nash equilibria
of the Stackelberg game and two simultaneous games are identified and discussed. Using
this procedure, a security team at a nuclear power plant can select the optimal strategy to
defend the plant from cyber-threats.
B.1 Bayesian Game Theory
Bayesian games are discussed in Chapter 3. This section provides additional background
about Bayesian game theory.
B.1.1 Stackelberg Games
Another factor to consider in constructing the Bayesian game is whether the game is

























































































































Figure 49: The extensive form of a Bayesian Stackelberg game.
at the same time. In a Stackelberg game, a leader chooses a strategy, then the follower
chooses a strategy after observing the leader’s strategy. A Stackelberg game is appropriate
for many security applications where a defender first implements a security strategy and
then the attacker implements an offensive strategy after observing the defenses.
Consider a Bayesian Stackelberg game played by i and j. The notation is the same as
the example in Chapter 3, except here i is the leader and has a single type. The extensive
form of this Bayesian game is shown in Figure 49. An information set is constructed for i
because i does not know whether j is type θ1j or θ
2
j . There are no additional information sets
for j because i is a single type and j observes i’s strategy before selecting a strategy.
B.1.2 Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver
Here we discuss the Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver (DOBSS)
presented in [68]. DOBSS is a mixed-integer linear program that has been shown to quickly
solve Bayesian Stackelberg games. This efficiency is partly because DOBSS does not require
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the Harsanyi transformation to identify the Nash equilibrium. Within the context of a
security game, the leader is the defender and the follower is the attacker. The defender is
assumed to have a single type and the attacker is assumed to have multiple types. The
assumption that the defender has a single type is dependent on the assumption that the
attacker’s utility is independent of the defender’s type, and is often a reasonable assumption
for security applications.










































zθij ∈ [0, 1]
qθj ∈ {0, 1}
mθ ∈ R
Let x be a vector denoting the leader’s strategy, and let i be a pure strategy contained
in x. Then, xi is the probability i is played in x. Let θ ∈ Θ denote the follower’s types, and
let qθ be a vector denoting θ’s strategy, where j is a pure strategy contained in q. Let X and
Q denote the index sets of the leader’s and follower’s pure strategies, respectively. Let Rθij
and Cθij be the payoff matrices for the leader and follower, respectively, when the follower is
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type θ. Let pθ be the a-priori probability of type θ. Let M be a large positive number and let
mθ be an upper bound on θ’s reward for any action. Finally, let zθij = xiq
θ
j . This relationship
can be used to calculate the leader’s optimal pure strategy.
DOBSS returns the optimal mixed strategy for the defender and a pure-strategy best
response for the attacker. A mixed-strategy best response is not required for the attacker,
because any pure strategy that is part of the support of a mixed-strategy best response
is also a best response. For greater detail regarding the derivation of DOBSS, readers are
referred to [68].
B.2 Bayesian Game Construction
This section describes the construction of the Bayesian games. Several aspects are similar
to the methods discussed in Chapter 4. The system under consideration is the RHR system
described in Chapter 4. There are some differences in the construction of the game, the most
notable of which is the definition of defender types.
B.2.1 The Defender’s Types
The defender’s types can be defined based on the defender’s preferential relationships on
avoiding negative losses. When given the choice between two losses, L1 and L2, a defender
of one type may prefer to incur L1, while a defender of another type may prefer to incur
L2. In general, if there are n consequences, this expression of preferences results in n! types.
The number of types is even greater when the defender’s preferences are cardinal rather
than ordinal. Simplifying assumptions or a brief list of consequences are required to define
a manageable set of types for the defender.
We define the defender’s types in terms of the losses described in Section 4.2.1. Here
we also consider loss of sensitive data to be a loss (L7). For each loss, we assume a range
of values describing its magnitude. These values are assumed for demonstration purposes.
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Table 29: The defender’s losses and their possible values.
Consequence Description Lower Limit ($) Upper Limit ($)
L1 Loss of power generation 1× 106 3× 106
L2 Environmental damage 1× 109 5× 1011
L3 Personnel injury or death 1× 106 5× 106
L4 Damaged public opinion 5× 105 1× 106
L5 Major equipment damage 1× 107 5× 107
L6 Core damage 1× 107 1× 108
L7 Loss of sensitive data 5× 105 5× 106
In practice, these values could be informed by business analysts, engineering teams, and
regulators. The consequences and their possible magnitudes are summarized in Table 29.
The defender’s types are defined by the magnitudes of these consequences. For this case
study, we define five types for the defender. The defender’s types and corresponding loss
magnitudes are given in Table 30.
We define each type based on whether the loss magnitudes are large or small within their
individual ranges. For the environmentalist type, the loss magnitudes for environmental
damage and core damage are at the top of their respective ranges. Similarly, the
humanitarian type assigns large values to personnel injury or death, the industrialist assigns
large values to loss of power generation, damaged public opinion, major equipment damage,
and core damage, and the data defender assigns large values to loss of sensitive data. The
true type of the defender assigns loss magnitudes that are in the middle or upper end of
their respective ranges. The defender is aware that his true type is θ1D, but the attacker is
unaware of the defender’s true type.
The definition of multiple defender types is generally only needed for Bayesian games
with simultaneous decisions. With the assumption that the attacker’s utility is independent


































































































































































































































































































p(θjA) 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.10
This is because in a Stackelberg game, the attacker observes the defender’s action, then acts
to maximize his own utility. The assumption that the attacker’s utility is independent of the
defender’s type is often reasonable.
B.2.2 Type Distributions
For this case study, we assume the type distributions in Table 31. We assume the
defender assigns the greatest probability to the terrorist type, followed by the government
cyberwarrior, disgruntled employee, and radical activist. We assume that the attacker
assigns high probability to the true defender, environmentalist, and humanitarian, and low
probability to the industrialist and data defender.
With the assumption that the distribution of types is common knowledge to the players,
the Bayesian game can be transformed from a game of incomplete information to a game
of imperfect information. This is a strong but necessary assumption to find the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. The assumption of common knowledge of the type distributions is most
reasonable if a large amount of intelligence used to construct the game is open-source, or
common knowledge among the players.
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B.3 The Players’ Actions
The actions available to the players are nearly identical to those discussed in Chapter 4.
There are some minor differences, so we discuss all actions here for clarity.
The attacker and defender each have several choices to make regarding each component
in the RHR system. For the defender, these choices address the configurations of the
industrial control system devices. For the attacker, these choices address the attack vector
for circumventing the defender’s cybersecurity controls. The choices available to each player
are summarized in Table 32.
We assume that the default configuration of each PLC is that authentication is off and
wireless communication is enabled. The defender can choose to enable authentication on
each PLC and can choose to disable wireless communication on each PLC. If the defender
has enabled authentication, the attacker will not be able to connect to the PLC. If the
defender has disabled wireless, the attacker will not be able to conduct the wireless exploit.
The attacker requires local access for the wireless exploit, but does not require local access
to connect with an unsecured PLC.
We assume that the default configuration of the switch is that the firewall is off. The
defender can choose to enable the firewall. In practice, there are many possibilities for
firewall configuration, but here we assume a binary decision to either enable or not enable
the firewall. The attacker can choose whether to attempt an attack. If the defender has
enabled the firewall, the attacker will not be able to conduct the attack.
We assume that the default configuration of the communication network is that all
communication is unencrypted. The defender can choose to enable encryption. In practice,
there are several encryption standards from which to choose and communication between
different devices can have different encryption protocols. Here we assume a binary decision
to either encrypt or not encrypt all communication. The attacker can choose whether or
not to attempt to eavesdrop. If the attacker has compromised a PLC or the switch, and the
network is unencrypted, then the attacker has also compromised the communication between

























































































































































For each of the attack and defense scenarios, we have assumed that the attack will be
unsuccessful if the defender has implemented the corresponding defense. In practice, the
outcome is not deterministic. The outcome is dependent on the ability of both players to
execute their selected actions. For example, a complex and sophisticated custom attack
may not be executed correctly, even if the attacker has the financial resources to conduct
the attack. The probability that an attack is successful given that a specific defense has
implemented can be estimated using expert judgment, capture-the-flag experiments, and
metrics such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System [58, 28]. The stochastic nature
of the attack outcomes can be represented using chance nodes on the extensive form of the
Bayesian game.
A complete action for a player consists of selecting an option for each available choice.
For simplicity, we consolidate the defender’s choices across the PLCs. Specifically, we give
the defender the choice to enable authentication on all or none of the PLCs and the choice to
disable wireless on all or none of the PLCs. We allow the attacker the option to connect or
exploit individual PLCs. An example of a complete defender action is: enable authentication
on all of the PLCs, disable wireless on all of the PLCs, enable the firewall on the switch, and
enable encryption on the communication network. An example of a complete attacker action
is: connect to PLC-1A and PLC-1B and do not connect PLC-2A and PLC-2B, conduct a
wireless exploit on PLC-2A and PLC-2B and do not exploit PLC-1A and PLC-1B, do not
attack the switch, and eavesdrop on the communication network.
B.3.1 Action Profiles and Consequences
In this game, the outcome of a cyber attack depends upon several factors. Two obvious
factors are the actions chosen by the players. The set of actions chosen by the players during
a particular play of the game is referred to as an action profile. In contrast, a strategy profile
specifies the actions taken by all types of all players. In addition to the action profile, the
outcome of an attack is also dependent on other NPP systems that interact with the RHR
system. To cause severe consequences, not only must the cyber attack be successful, but
also redundant plant systems and safety systems must fail.
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First, we will consider the consequences that only depend upon the game’s action profile.
The loss of sensitive data consequence is assumed to be the only consequence that is
dependent solely on the action profile. This is because most of the consequences are physical
and are also dependent on other NPP systems. We assume the damaged public opinion
consequence can only occur if another physical consequence occurs. Data loss can occur if
any of the attacker’s offensive actions are not defended.
Second, we will consider the consequences that depend upon the game’s action profile
and other NPP systems. To model the game’s dependency on other NPP systems, we first
consider the hazards of the RHR system (Section 4.1. Each hazard may be caused by
certain action profiles. Table 12 shows which hazards can occur as a consequence of different
combinations of hacked devices. We do not list each action profile because there are multiple
ways some devices can be hacked.
Many of the defender’s severe consequences are dependent on the failure mode of the
RHR system and the failure of other NPP systems. For example, if both RHR systems
operating in LPCI mode fail, the core spray system can also provide core cooling. The
probability of failure of other plant systems can be calculated using a risk analysis method
like fault tree analysis or Bayesian networks. The probabilities that we have assumed for
this example are shown in Table 33. Note the probability that each hazard causes L7 is zero.
This is because L7 is not a physical loss, and is not dependent on any of the hazards we
have identified. Additionally, while L4 may occur as a result of a physical failure, it may
also occur as a direct result of the action profiles.
B.3.2 The Players’ Utility Functions
The players’ utility functions quantify the outcome of the game and enable us to identify
effective security strategies. The utility functions capture the cost of the players’ actions
and the impact of a successful attack. The utility functions are given by Equations B.1 and
B.2.
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Table 33: The probability of hazards causing losses.
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7
H1 — 5× 10−6 5× 10−5 — 2× 10−2 5× 10−4 —
H2 5× 10−2 5× 10−6 5× 10−5 4× 10−1 1× 100 5× 10−4 —
H3 — — — 3× 10−1 — 8× 10−3 —
H4 1× 100 — — 9× 10−1 — — —
H5 — 1× 10−5 1× 10−4 — — 1× 10−3 —
H6 — 1× 10−6 1× 10−5 — — 1× 10−4 —
H7 2× 10−2 — — — — — —
uD(sD, sA, θD) = ΨD(sD) + E[ΩD(sA, sD, θD)] (B.1)
uA(sD, sA, θA) = ΨA(sA, θA) + E[ΩA(sA, sD, θA)] (B.2)
The utility functions of the players have two terms. The first term, ΨD/A, is the expense
associated with the player’s strategy. The second term, E[ΩD/A], is the expected value of
the gain or loss from a successful attack.
The first terms in Equations B.1 and B.2 are the costs to the players for selecting
their strategies. For the defender, this term is the expense of implementing cybersecurity
measures. We assume that the expenses for the defender’s strategy are the same for all of
the defender’s types. This is because the type definitions for the defender are based on the
defender’s loss magnitudes, not the defender’s capabilities. This term may be positive in
some applications. For example, if a cybersecurity action is expected to improve operational
efficiency, the plant may expect a profit from implementing the action. For the attacker, this
term is the expense of conducting a cyber attack. The attacker’s expenses are dependent
on the attacker’s type. For both players, we assume that this term is not dependent on the
opponent’s strategy or type.
The expenses for the defender’s and attacker’s choices are summarized in Table 34. We
have assumed these values based on the access, resources, and skill of the threat agents as
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defined by the TAL. These values are assumed for demonstration purposes. In practice,
additional threat intelligence and financial data should also be used. The government
resources of the government cyberwarrior and organization resources of the radical activist
and terrorist provide them with some advantages over the disgruntled employee, but the
disgruntled employee’s internal access to the NPP can also result in some reduced expenses.
We assume that there is no expense to the attacker to abstain from a particular action.
We also assume that there is no expense to the defender to leave a device in its default
configuration.
The second terms in Equations B.1 and B.2 are the expected values of the reward or
penalty from a successful attack. The terms are expected values because the success of an
attack is often dependent on the failure of other NPP systems outside of the players’ control
(as described in Section B.3.1). For both players, this term is a function of the game’s
strategy profile, and the individual player’s type. We assume that the defender only cares
about whether or not a loss occurs, and that the perpetrator of the attack is irrelevant; that
is, the second term is not a function of the attacker’s type. We make a similar assumption
for the attacker.
To find the expected values of the gain or loss from a successful attack, we need to know
the magnitude of the attack outcome and the probability that the attack is successful. The
magnitudes of the attack outcomes come from each player’s type definition. The consequence
magnitudes for the defender’s types are given in Table 30 and the consequence magnitudes
for the attacker’s types are given in Table 10. The probability of attack success is often
dependent on the failure of other redundant NPP systems. The probability of each loss
given a particular hazard is shown in Table 33. We restrict the attacker to only cause one
hazard. If the attacker has the capability to cause multiple hazards, we assume the attacker
























































































































































































































































































































Table 35: Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian Stackelberg game.
Player Type Strategy Expected utility




Attacker Radical activist Abstain from all attacks $0
Attacker Disgruntled employee Abstain from all attacks $0
Attacker Gov. cyberwarrior Abstain from all attacks $0
Attacker Terrorist Abstain from all attacks $0
B.4 Results and Discussion
In this section we discuss the results for three formulations of the Bayesian cybersecurity
game: a Stackelberg game and two simultaneous games. The first simultaneous game has
one defender type, and the second simultaneous game has four defender types.
B.4.1 Stackelberg Game
In this Stackelberg formulation of the Bayesian game, the defender has a single type
and the attacker has four types. DOBSS was used to solve the Stackelberg game. In the
Stackelberg game, first the defender chooses a strategy without knowledge of the true type
of the attacker, then the attacker chooses a strategy after observing the defender’s strategy.
The Nash equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg game is summarized in Table 35. In this
game, the Nash equilibrium solution is for the defender to implement all security measures,
and for every attacker type to abstain from attacking. At the Nash equilibrium, the defender
incurs the cost of defense implementation, and the attackers do not lose or gain utility.
This Nash equilibrium is expected, given the structure of the game. In constructing the
game, we have assumed that if a defender has implemented a defense for a given attack, the
attack will be unsuccessful. If the defender were to choose not to implement a defense, the
attacker would be able to observe that and exploit that specific vulnerability. But, if the
170
defender has infallibly implemented all defenses, and the attacker can observe the defender’s
strategy before selecting his strategy, it is expected that the attacker would abstain from
attacking. It would not be rational for the attacker to incur the cost of attacking while
knowing that no reward can be gained.
B.4.2 Simultaneous Game with One Defender Type
Solving Bayesian simultaneous games with large strategy spaces and large numbers of
types is computationally expensive. To make the problem more tractable, we assume the
attacker’s strategy space consists of the set of hacked devices necessary to cause a physical
failure (Table 12), and the method by which those devices are hacked. This reduces the
attacker’s pure strategy space from 1,024 strategies to 18 strategies. Each individual PLC
can be hacked either by connecting or by wireless exploit, each pair of PLCs can be hacked
by the four combinations of connecting and wireless exploits, and the switch and network can
only be hacked together if the attacker attacks the switch and eavesdrops on the network.
The attacker can also abstain from attacking.
This simultaneous game was solved using Gambit. A Nash equilibrium of the
simultaneous game is summarized in Table 36. At this Nash equilibrium, the defender
implements all defenses with near-certainty, and is expected to only incur the cost of strategy
implementation. The radical activist, disgruntled employee, and terrorist types abstain from
attacking and do not gain or lose utility. The government cyberwarrior type has a large
probability of abstaining, but also a significant probability of attacking the switch and
network, and near-zero probability of attacking PLC-2B. The government cyberwarrior’s
expected utility is nonzero because of the positive probability assigned to attacks on PLC-
2B, the switch, and network. It is positive because there is a small chance the attacker
could target a vulnerability the defender has not addressed. The expected utilities for both
the defender and attacker are close to the cost of implementing the dominant pure strategy






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Enumerating over all possible Nash equilibria in a Bayesian simultaneous game is
computationally expensive. This is one Nash equilibrium of the game, but more equilibria
may exist. For example, it is likely that a similar equilibrium exists where the government
cyberwarrior connects to or wirelessly exploits PLC-1B instead of PLC-2B. This is for three
reasons: (1) PLC-1B and PLC-2B serve similar roles in the RHR system, (2) compromising
PLC-1B or PLC-2B can lead to the same failures, and (3) it costs the same amount to attack
either PLC. It is also possible that other equilibria exist where the government cyberwarrior
abstains from attacking, and one of the other attacker types assigns positive probability to an
attack strategy. If multiple equilibria are found to exist, methods such as Pareto dominance,
risk dominance, or focal points can be used to identify the most credible equilibrium [29, 73].
B.4.3 Simultaneous Game with Four Defender Types
In this game, we use the same action sets as in the previous simultaneous game. Instead
of using one defender type, we consider four types: the true defender, environmentalist,
humanitarian, and industrialist, as defined in Section B.2.1. To reduce computational
expense, we eliminate the data defender type and we increase the probability of the
industrialist type from 0.10 to 0.15.
This simultaneous game was solved using Gambit. A Nash equilibrium of the
simultaneous game is summarized in Table 37. The results of this game are similar to that
of the previous simultaneous game. At this equilibrium, the true defender, environmentalist,
and industrialist types all implement every cybersecurity defense, and the humanitarian
type implements every defense with near-certainty. The humanitarian type implements
every defense slightly more frequently than the defender in the previous simultaneous game.
The radical activist, disgruntled employee, and terrorist types abstain from attacking and
do not gain or lose utility. The government cyberwarrior type has a large probability of
abstaining, but also a significant probability of attacking the switch and network, and near-
zero probability of attacking PLC-2B. The cyberwarrior has slightly greater probability of
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abstaining from attack in this game than in the previous simultaneous game. The government
cyberwarrior’s expected utility is nonzero because of the positive probability assigned to
attacks on PLC-2B, the switch, and network.
Similar to the simultaneous game with one defender type, it is possible that more Nash
equilibria exist. For the same reasons as above, it is likely that a similar equilibrium exists
where the government cyberwarrior connects or wirelessly exploits PLC-1B instead of PLC-
2B. It is also possible that other equilibria exist where the government cyberwarrior abstains
from attacking, and one of the other attacker types assigns positive probability to an attack
strategy. Similarly, it is also possible that other equilibria exist where the humanitarian
type implements all defenses and one of the other defender types assigns positive probability
to more than one pure strategy. If multiple equilibria are found to exist, methods such as
Pareto dominance, risk dominance, or focal points can be used to identify the most credible
equilibrium [29, 73].
B.5 Summary and Conclusions
A strong cybersecurity program is essential to protect the critical assets of commercial
nuclear power plants. As cyber-physical systems, nuclear power plants must have an effective
cybersecurity program to ensure efficient and safe operations in the physical world. Nuclear
power plants may be targeted by a variety of threat agents with varying motivations and
capabilities. Nuclear power plant security teams must defend against this spectrum of threats
while remaining cost-effective. To meet this need, a Bayesian game-theoretic approach was
presented.
A Bayesian game-theoretic approach enables nuclear power plant security teams to
identify an optimal cybersecurity strategy, given their knowledge of potential threat agents.
Several tools were presented to assist security teams in the construction of a Bayesian game.
Using these tools, a security team can identify the threats that pose the greatest risk to the
plant, and model those threats as types in a Bayesian game. The construction and solution































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The games constructed in this paper indicate that it is best for the defender to implement
all cybersecurity actions to protect the residual heat removal system. The Stackelberg game
indicated that the defender should implement all defenses, and the two simultaneous games
indicated that the defender should implement all defenses with a probability close to one.
Although these results may appear obvious in retrospect, they do not devalue the merit of
the analysis. The results may not be as intuitive for games where the potential cybersecurity
costs are larger relative to the magnitude of the defender’s consequences if the plant system
is hacked.
From the attacker’s perspective, it was demonstrated that the attacker should not attack
in the Stackelberg game, and the attacker should nearly always abstain from attacks in
the simultaneous games. The defender benefited from the uncertainty introduced in the
simultaneous game with multiple defender types. The attacker should abstain 93% of the
time in the simultaneous game with one defender type, but the attacker should abstain 95%
of the time in the simultaneous game with four defender types. If the attacker does choose
to attack in either of the simultaneous games, it is most likely that the attacker would target
the switch and communication network. Although this is considered a modification of the
original game, the defender could choose to leverage those results by closely monitoring the
switch and communication network.
Implementing a Bayesian cybersecurity game requires a multi-disciplinary team. Risk
engineers and nuclear engineers provide insight into NPP processes and safety systems.
Industrial control engineers and cybersecurity experts provide insight into the offensive
and defensive actions that can be included in the game. Threat intelligence experts are
valuable for the construction of the attacker’s types. Using a Bayesian game-theoretic
approach, cybersecurity teams can optimally allocate resources to protect the plant, given
their knowledge of malicious threat actors.
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